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TEACHING LEGAL RESEARCH AND
WRITING WITH ACTUAL LEGAL WORK:
EXTENDING CLINICAL EDUCATION
INTO THE FIRST YEAR
MICHAEL
STEVEN

A. MILLEMANN*
D. SCHWINN**

In this article, the co-authors argue that legal research and writing (LRW) teachers should use actual legal work to generate assignments. They recommend that clinical and LRW teachers work
together to design, co-teach, and evaluate such courses. They describe
two experimental courses they developed together and co-taught to
support and clarify their arguments.
They contend that actual legal work motivates students to learn
the basic skills of research, analysis and writing, and thus helps to
accomplish the primary goals of LRW courses. It also helps students
to explore new dimensions of basic skills, including those related to
the development and use of facts and the construction of legal arguments in response to indeterminate legal issues. Through actual legal
work, they say, LRW teachers can achieve importantsecondary educational goals as well, including introducingstudents to a client-centered, problem-solving form of representation, professional
responsibility issues (especially access-to-justice and pro bono issues), and critical analysis of law and justice systems.
Engagingfirst-year students in actual legal work can bring real
clients into the classroom, demonstrate to students that they can help
others (and that they like doing so), and thereby reinforce their idealism. The authors say these are good refinements in the culture of
traditionalfirst-year legal education. Their proposalalso would help
individuals and community organizationsobtain legal assistance they
need to prevent and resolve legal problems. A LRW professor and
students can provide representationthat otherwise would not be provided. In the longer term, they argue that engaging students in law
school in legal work on behalf of poor and underrepresentedpeople
and groups will encourage a number of them to provide legal services
to similar clients in the future.

* Jacob A. France Professor of Public Interest Law, University of Maryland School of
Law.
** Law School Assistant Professor; Associate Director of Legal Writing.
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1

In this article, we advocate using actual legal work to teach legal
research and writing (LRW) courses, including first year courses. By
"actual legal work," we mean work that is part of an ongoing or
planned lawsuit, transaction, negotiation or other form of legal representation. We focus on litigation, although what we propose applies to
non-litigation projects as well.
We believe there are five key elements in using actual legal work
effectively to teach LRW courses:
Feasibility: The LRW teacher should be able expediently to convert the legal work into LRW assignments. This might involve adding
hypothetical features to an actual matter without compromising its
2
real-world quality.
Legal need: The beneficiaries of the students' legal work should
be members of groups that have problems obtaining the legal assistance they need. 3 Paradoxically, to teach effectively with actual legal
work it is helpful if the immediate beneficiaries are represented, either
by a lawyer from inside the school (for example, a clinical or LRW
teacher) or from outside the school (for example, a legal services, pro
bono, or private lawyer). Even if the immediate beneficiaries are represented, the "legal need" guideline should help to assure that LRW
4
course resources help those who need it.
1 We are indebted to many for their assistance in researching and writing this article.
They include Philipp Pierson, James Goodwin, Kathleen Woodward, Chad Harris, and
Justin Browne, our research assistants; Susan G. McCarty, Research Fellow; and Richard
Boldt, who made a number of excellent editorial suggestions that we have incorporated in
this article.
2 See infra Part II(A)(6) for a description of how we modified an actual post-conviction matter to teach an appellate advocacy course.
3 The 1994 American Bar Association (ABA) Comprehensive Legal Needs Study surveyed the unmet legal needs of low- and moderate-income persons (households with incomes up to $60,000). CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC, AM. BAR
ASS'N, LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS 11-17 (1994). It
found that only twenty-nine percent of "low-income households" and thirty-nine percent
of "moderate income households" that had legal problems used the "civil justice system"
to resolve those problems. Id. at 11. That is, seven out of ten low-income households and
six out of ten moderate-income households that had legal problems did not use our legal
system to resolve them. Id. at 12. Many failed to use the legal system because they could
not afford to retain counsel. Id. at 15. Although there is some national funding for civil
legal services, it is grossly inadequate to meet the legal needs of indigents. See, e.g., Alan
W. Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance for Low-Income Persons: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1213 (2002). Similarly, many public defender programs do not receive the resources they need to effectively represent indigent defendants.
See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal
Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783.
4 In some matters, the lawyer may need additional help to represent effectively the
client. In others, the promise of assistance from a LRW professor and students may enable
a lawyer to take on the representation. The students' work also may indirectly benefit
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Secondary educational goals:5 In addition to core LRW skillsresearch, analysis, and writing-the courses should include professional responsibility, access-to-justice, and law reform issues, to the
extent possible. 6 The primary and secondary goals are interrelated.
Law is contextual. To understand it, one needs to assess its effectshow and to whom it is applied. This is part of the analysis that is central to good writing.
Visible clients: The LRW professors should bring them, literally or
figuratively, into the courses, and teach with their stories. This is a
major source of the teaching power of actual legal work and an essential step in improving the quality, and changing the culture, of firstyear legal education. 7
LRW/clinical collaboration: LRW and clinical teachers should
collaborate on these courses, especially the initial ones. This would
extend clinical education, in modest forms, into the first year of law
school and build curricular bridges between LRW and clinical courses,
which largely are separate enterprises today.8
unrepresented members of the client's group. Ultimately, working on an actual matter may
encourage the students, when they become lawyers, to provide legal services to members
of underrepresented groups. See infra Part III(A)(2)(b).
5 We say "secondary" not because these goals are unimportant. To the contrary, we
believe these are among the most important goals of legal educators. We call them "secondary" to distinguish them from the core skills of legal research, writing, and analysis that
are the primary focus of most LRW courses. See infra Part I(B).
6 See infra Part III(B)(1).
7 See Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1731, 1733 (1993).
8 In 2001, Elliott Milstein, a past president of the Association of American Law
Schools (AALS), former law school dean, and long-time clinical teacher, addressed the
Association of Legal Writing Directors. He described the road clinical teachers had taken
to obtain more permanent and equal membership in law school faculties, which included a
fair amount of institutional "schmoozing." Plenary, Is the Tail Wagging the Dog?: Institutional Forces Affecting CurricularInnovation, 1 J. Ass'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 184,
197 (2002), available at http://www.alwd.org/; Terri LeClercq, Proceedingsof 2002 Conference: A Challengefrom the Future: Legal Writing, 2009, 9 LEGAL WRITING 111-12 (2003).
Based on Milstein's talk, Terri LeClercq constructs an imaginary scenario in which LRW
teachers, with the support of the Legal Writing Institute, develop a campaign nicknamed
"Operation Schmooze" to upgrade their status within law schools. Part of this imaginary
campaign involves forging partnerships with clinical teachers. LeClercq says: "Oddly,
before Operation Schmooze, it was rare for the legal writing faculty to work with clinicians.
Now, we offered to co-teach classes. We worked with them to develop cross-disciplinary
journals, professional formats for moot court, and community outreach writing. From the
clinicians we absorbed an understanding of the larger legal world and a hands-on practicality that has improved our teaching. In turn, we have helped clinicians integrate process
writing in their courses and have helped their public image through community writing
projects." Id. at 112. The collaborative courses that we describe in this article represent
our endorsement of LeClercq's vision. Despite all of the good reasons for collaboration,
however, the LRW and clinical curricula in most law schools today remain largely separate.
See Mary Beth Beazley, Better Writing, Better Thinking: Using Legal Writing Pedagogy in
the "Casebook" Classroom (without Grading Papers), 10 LEGAL WRITING 23, 38-39 (2004).
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We envision a continuum of possible hybrid courses. Here are

some possible points on that continuum:
A. A LRW course taught by a LRW teacher in which the assignments are based on actual legal work drawn from a clinic or outside

public or private law firm.
B. A LRW course co-taught by a LRW and clinical teacher in
which the assignments are based on actual legal work from the clinical

teacher's separate clinical course.
C. A course that includes clinical and LRW components and is
co-taught by a LRW and clinical teacher, in which the assignments are
based on actual legal work from the integrated clinical component or
an outside public or private law firm.
D. A clinical course taught by a clinical teacher that includes a
LRW component, for example, an appellate advocacy clinic taught by
a clinical teacher in which second-year students satisfy a LRW appel-

late advocacy course requirement by representing actual clients in
appeals. 9
To support our arguments, we describe two experimental courses
that we co-taught, which fit the B and C profiles above. They were the

second and third courses in our required LRW sequence, which we
call Legal Analysis, Writing and Research ("LAWR"). 10 We used actual legal work drawn from a clinic and from outside public and pri-

vate law firms to generate the assignments in these two courses.
We offer four justifications for our proposal.
First, by using actual legal work, LRW professors can teach basic
LRW skills more effectively. Students learn the basic skills better because they take the course more seriously. The closer the student
Leading clinical teachers and scholars have argued that the clinical methodology should be
an integrated part of non-clinical courses. See, e.g., Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin &
Peter A. Joy, Clinical Educationfor this Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLIN. L. REV. 1,46
(2000) (arguing that "[tihe most effective approach to clinical studies is to integrate clinical
methodology throughout the law school's course offerings while at the same time constructing a series of progressive clinical experiences.") Adding clinical components to LRW
courses is a logical step in this integrative process.
9 A member of our faculty, Renee M. Hutchins, is teaching such a course. See infra
note 106.
10 To be clear on our acronyms: We use "LRW" to refer generically to legal research
and writing courses, and "LAWR" to refer to the sequence of LRW courses in our school,
called Legal Analysis, Writing and Research I, II and III. Students take the required
LAWR courses in their first three semesters of law school: LAWR I for three credits;
LAWR I for two credits (with a third credit for a separate research unit); and LAWR III
for two credits. LAWR I introduces students to the structure of the American legal system
and sources of legal authority. Students are taught to read and understand cases and statutes, and to understand the relationships among cases, statutes and regulations. Students
learn to communicate their analysis by writing office memoranda to supervising attorneys,
advice letters to clients, bench memoranda to judges, and other standard practice documents. LAWR II and LAWR III are described infra Part II(A) and (B).
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comes to being responsible for some aspect of the client's matter, the
greater the motivational and therefore educational value of the work.
This teaching-with-responsibility method is the centerpiece of
clinical education. What we found interesting is that it worked well in
a two-credit, 27-student LRW course, even though the students' responsibility for the client's matter was indirect (secondary to that of
the lawyers), shared (with many other students), and limited (to one
issue in a multi-issue case). 1 ' In short, a little responsibility will go a
12
long way to motivate students to do their best.
LRW teachers also can use actual legal work to teach students
additional dimensions of core LRW skills, including how to work with
factual and legal indeterminacy. In many "canned problems," which
we define in Part I (C), the teacher gives the students a limited set of
fixed and unambiguous facts. In practice, lawyers must discover and
recreate facts, and they often are dynamic and ambiguous. The use of
actual cases gave our students opportunities they would not have had
with canned problems to act as factual investigators, organizers, inter13
preters, and advocates.
The legal issues also usually are more indeterminate in actual
cases than in canned problems. Many consider this to be a pedagogical weakness, but we found it to be a strength. It required the students
to be active learners and creative thinkers and underscored the importance of continuing theory-of-the-case analysis. It thereby introduced
students to the dialectical process that good lawyers use to develop,
14
test, refine, and eventually select legal arguments.
This is not our pedagogical version of "chaos" theory. 15 Some
ambiguity, like some responsibility, goes a long way in inviting stu11 See infra Part II(A) for a description of this two-credit appellate advocacy course,
Legal Analysis, Writing and Research Il.
12 In Part II(A), infra, we describe the motivational qualities of the post-conviction
case that we used to teach the LAWR III course, and in Part III(A)(1)(a), infra, we describe its impact on the students. In our experience, the teaching-with-responsibility
method works even when the "client" is a potential future client, e.g., the legal work is in
the planning phase, as long as the students can identify real people who have the legal
problem on which they are working and who can benefit from their work. It is important
that the teacher "introduce" to the students, either in person or through descriptions, the
people who might benefit from the students' legal work. See infra Part II(B) (describing
the civil right-to-counsel project).
13 See infra Parts II(A)(2)(b), III(A)(1)(b)(i).
14 In Part III(A)(1)(b), infra, we describe how fluidity of facts and indeterminacy of
legal issues in our actual legal work helped us to achieve important educational goals.
15 See generally JOHN BRIGGS & F. DAVID PEAT, TURBULENT MIRROR: AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO CHAOS THEORY AND THE SCIENCE OF WHOLENESS

(1990) (providing

an introduction to the many faces of chaos; revealing how chaos theory directs most of the
processes of everyday life and how it appears that everything in the universe is
interconnected).
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dents to assume more control in selecting and making legal arguments. Too much indeterminacy can be immobilizing. The goal is to
find the right balance.
Second, teaching with actual legal work serves important secondary educational goals. 16 It introduces students to: a) a client-centered, problem-solving method of work; b) critical legal analysis of law
and justice systems; and c) professional responsibility issues, especially
access-to-justice and pro bono issues. In the last respect, integration of
actual legal work into LRW courses, particularly in the first year, gives
law schools a special opportunity to begin to teach professional re17
sponsibility more "pervasively," as Deborah Rhode has proposed.
Third, engaging first year students in actual legal work can help to
change the culture of traditional first-year legal education, which now
is dominated by theoretical and Socratic instruction. Adding a practice-based, public interest component can reduce students' disengagement and nourish their idealism.
Fourth, using actual legal work to teach LRW courses can help
people to obtain more effective access to justice. This is both socially
useful and educational for the students. In the latter respect, it is a
source of student motivation, and thus enhanced education.
In Part I, we briefly review the history of LRW education in law
schools. One striking feature of this history is the failure to link LRW
and clinical education. We believe that law schools should do more to
foster LRW-clinical partnerships and that our proposal is one way to
do this.
In Part II, we describe the two experimental LAWR courses that
we co-taught using actual legal work.
One was a two-credit appellate advocacy course: LAWR 111.18 We
developed the assignments for the twenty-seven students' appellate
briefs and oral arguments from a post-conviction matter, which came
from a newly-created post-conviction clinic. The clinic students
worked closely with the LAWR III students. In 1970, our client was
sentenced to prison for life for felony murder. In fact, he did not commit the crime. We used the students' work to represent the client with
a dramatic result: The client was released from prison after thirty-six
years when the governor commuted his sentence.
To create the second course, we added a three-credit clinical com16 See supra note 5 for our caveat about the term "secondary."
17 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDuc. 31,
32 (1992) (proposing "teaching professional responsibility ... as a topic to be addressed
throughout the curricula"). Similarly, LRW scholars recommend teaching writing pervasively. See, e.g., Carol McCrehan Parker, Writing Throughout the Curriculum; Why Law
Schools Need It and How to Achieve It, 76 NEB. L. REV. 561 (1997).

18 See infra Part H(A).
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ponent called "Legal Theory and Practice"'19 to a two-credit LAWR II
course that focuses on the pretrial, civil process. We accepted fifteen

second-semester students in this elective course. 20 The actual legal
work included a group of police brutality cases from a small, private

law firm and a civil rights project from a public interest organization
(the goal of which is to develop a qualified right to counsel in civil
cases). 21 The outside lawyers were responsible for the representation.
We made the assignments and supervised and taught with the students' work.

In Part III (A), we make our four sets of arguments in support of
using actual legal work to teach LRW courses. In Part III (B), we
identify the challenges posed by using actual legal work to teach LRW

courses and we respond to them.
Before moving on, we add an important qualification. To avoid

repetition, we do not reiterate it as we make each of our arguments,
but we ask the reader to keep it in mind throughout the article. Consider it a continuing caveat.
In contrasting actual legal work and canned problems, we do not
mean to suggest that canned problems are bad or are all the same. In
19 See infra Part II(B). The students in this course received a sixth credit for a research
unit of the LAWR II course that other faculty members taught. Our Legal Theory and
Practice ("LTP") components add a practice piece to the theory that is the focus of the
course to which it is attached, as well as professional responsibility, justice, and critical
legal theory segments. From time to time, we have added LTP components to first-year
Torts, Contracts, Criminal Law, Property, Legal Profession, and Civil Procedure courses,
as well as to the LAWR 11 course that we describe in Part II (B), and to a variety of
second-year courses and seminars as well. In all of the LTP courses, students have studied
law and legal systems in theory and practice, helped to provide legal services to poor and
underrepresented persons and communities, and analyzed and often participated in efforts
to reform the law and improve access to justice. Day division students at our law school are
required to take an experiential course as a condition of graduation. LTP courses as well as
clinical courses satisfy this requirement. Named for School of Law alumnus Representative
Benjamin Cardin, who helped to generate the resources for new LTP faculty members, this
"Cardin requirement" helps to make experiential education a key component of our curriculum. See generally Barbara Bezdek, Reconstructing a Pedagogy of Responsibility, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 1159 (1992); Richard Boldt & Marc Feldman, The Faces of Law in Theory
and Practice:Doctrine, Rhetoric, and Social Context, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1111 (1992); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1175 (1992); Homer C. LaRue, Developing an Identity of
Responsible Lawyering Through Experiential Learning, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1147 (1992).
20 In our school, students in the second semester can take one three-credit elective.
21 The organization is the Public Justice Center. See Welcome to the Public Justice
Center, http://www.publicjustice.org/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). There are a number of
organizations nationally involved in similar "Civil Gideon" Projects. Some of these organizations include the Brennan Center for Justice and the Public Justice Center. See, e.g.,
Brennan Center, Access to Justice: Civil Gideon, http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/
pov/civil-gideon.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2006); Public Justice Center, Current Focus Areas: Civil Gideon, http://www.publicjustice.org/current-focus-area/index.cfm?subpageid=36
(last visited Jan. 26, 2006).
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recent years, many teachers, including those who teach LRW courses,
have developed sophisticated teaching problems and materials that
have features of actual legal work, e.g., nuanced descriptions of clients
(including of real clients in actual cases), real case materials (pleadings, depositions, and trial transcripts), and complex and even evolving facts. Some problems are based on actual matters and include
documents, press accounts, and party interviews related to them.
Other problems are accompanied by creative, multi-media, and dynamic teaching materials, e.g., videotaped interviews, depositions, and
negotiations; exercises that parcel out additional "facts" in response to
student "discovery" requests; and retrospective interviews with clients, parties, and counsel in concluded cases. Much of this work has
been creative and coordinated across the legal writing community,
and has resulted in an array of rich and highly realistic simulations.
We applaud these developments. They have added badly needed
diversity, depth, and simulated experiences to legal education. In varying degrees, they can achieve some of the educational goals that we
identify in this article. As we make our arguments, and especially in
our conclusion, we do our best to identify the unique contributions of
actual legal work, as well as some of the common benefits of actual
legal work and good problems.

I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL RESEARCH
AND WRITING COURSES

A.

An Abbreviated History

In the 1920s, law schools began to offer "Bibliography" courses
that taught students how to find the law. 22 The method was mechanical, with little instruction in analysis or writing.2 3 During the 1930s and
24
1940s, courses like this became common in law schools.
The prevalent disdain for skills education, grounded in the rejection of education by apprenticeship, tainted these courses and those
who taught them. Most of the LRW articles published in the Journal
of Legal Education in the 1950s "describe the various efforts by law
22 This era in LRW instruction began with a publication by Frederick C. Hicks. See
FREDERICK C. HICKS, MATERIALS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH (1923). See also
Marjorie Dick Rombauer, First-Year Legal Research and Writing: Then and Now, 25 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 538, 539 (1973); Emily Grant, Toward a Deeper Understanding of Legal
Research and Writing as a Developing Profession, 27 VT. L. REV. 371 (2003).
23 David S. Romantz, The Truth about Cats and Dogs: Legal Writing Courses and the
Law School Curriculum, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 105, 128 (2003) (noting that Hicks's text, and
courses that followed it, "focused largely on the mechanical aspects of legal bibliography").
24 See Robert A. Leflar, Survey of Curriculain Smaller Law Schools, 9 AM. L. ScH.
REV. 255, 258 (1939) (noting that twenty-three of the surveyed forty-five schools required
first-year courses in "Use of Lawbooks" or a similarly-designed course).
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schools to farm out legal writing courses to teaching fellows, adjunct

'25
faculty, students-anyone other than regular faculty.
During the 1960s and '70s, some law schools developed more ho-

listic "Legal Writing" and "Legal Method" courses. 26 The legal writing
courses sought to ensure that law school graduates were competent
writers as well as researchers. 27 The legal method courses added case
analysis and synthesis.
By the 1980s, many law schools had created courses that combined legal research, analysis and writing. However, these courses and

the faculty who primarily taught them retained a second-class status in
28
many schools.
In 1992, the American Bar Association (ABA) published the
"MacCrate Report. ' 29 The Report criticized legal educators for
neglecting skills education and emphasized the importance of legal
writing and research, among other skills. 30 The Report helped to put
skills education, including skills taught in LRW courses, on the educational agendas of many law schools.
B.

Today's LRW Courses

Today, the substantial majority of LRW courses focus on re31
search, writing and analysis.
25 Romantz, supra note 23, at 132 (citing Stewart Macaulay & Henry G. Manne, A
Low-Cost Legal Writing Program-TheWisconsin Experience, 11 J. LEGAL EDUC. 387,404
(1959); Irwin 0. Spiegel, Experimenting in Legal Method at the University of Southern California, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 92, 96-97 (1956)). But see Rombauer, supra note 22, at 540-41
(describing some legal educators' development of courses that integrated "writing and 'legal thinking' abilities" as the existence of "[o]ther currents running at the same time" and
noting that "the first popular legal method course book ... was being used in more than
fifty schools" by 1948).
26 See Rombauer, supra note 22, at 550-51 (discussing the results of the author's 1970
survey of legal writing courses).
27 Id. at 540. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, Legal Writing-The Drake Program, 3 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 583 (1951).
28 William R. Trail & William D. Underwood, The Decline of ProfessionalLegal Training and a Proposalfor Its Revitalization in ProfessionalLaw Schools, 48 BAYLOR L. REV.
201, 235-36 (1996) (noting that "[1]egal writing in particular has long been the pariah of the
law school curriculum"). See also infra text accompanying notes 47-50.
29 SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR Ass'N,
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE
GAP: LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CON-

TINUUM (1992). This report is universally referred to today as the "MACCRATE REPORT."
30 The Report identified ten "Fundamental Lawyering Skills:" (1) Problem Solving, (2)
Legal Analysis and Reasoning, (3) Legal Research, (4) Factual Investigation, (5) Communication, (6) Counseling, (7) Negotiation, (8) Litigation and Alternative Dispute-Resolution Procedures, (9) Organization and Management of Legal Work, and (10) Recognizing
and Resolving Ethical Dilemmas. Id. at 138-40.
31 Lucia Ann Silecchia, Legal Skills Training in the First Year of Law School: Research?
Writing? Analysis? Or More?, 100 DICK. L. REV. 245, 253 (1996). "Of 111 respondents" in
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Most schools require a sequence of LRW courses beginning in the first
semester. 32 In the typical course, the students perform research and
produce written products. Frequently, the products in the first semester are legal memoranda like those that would be submitted to part-

ners in law firms (usually with critiques and rewrites) and other kinds
of documents aimed at developing related communication skills. 33 In a
later semester, students most typically prepare appellate briefs, usu34
ally with at least one draft for critique.
The "reforms and changes" that LRW directors are making or

contemplating making are consistent with teaching with actual legal
work. They include "addition of client interviewing and negotiation
training, incorporation of fact-finding exercises... increased attention
to professional responsibility issues, fuller integration of research and

writing [and] combination of skills training with other first year
courses . . .35
LRW'scholars debate the merits of "limited" versus "expanded"
a 1995 LRW course survey, "83 defined their programs as 'traditional,"' id., with "research,
writing, and analysis [at the top of] the lists of subjects covered in first year skills courses
..... " Id. at 257. Of the two major skills, the attention given to "legal writing skills seemed
to outweigh [that given to] legal research skills by a fairly significant margin." Id. Only 17
schools said their programs followed a "lawyering skills" model," id. at 253, which adds
instruction in other skills, e.g., interviewing and negotiation, to that in basic LRW skills.
32 Ass'N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & LEGAL WRITING INST., 2002 SURVEY RESULTS 5
(2002), available at www.alwd.org/alwdResources/surveys/2002survey/2002survey.pdf. A
small minority of the schools responding to the survey waited until after the first semester
to begin. Id. The norm is two LRW courses in the first year. Most schools award two
credits for each semester; some only one. Id. Most schools add LRW grades into the student's GPA, although over twenty do not, including some that offer LRW courses on a
pass/fail basis. Id. at 6.
33 Terry Jean Seligmann, Beyond "Bingo!": Educating Legal Researchers as Problem
Solvers, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 179, 184-85 (2000). Professor Seligmann provides a
clear picture and useful critique of modern LRW courses. See also RALPH L. BRILL ET AL.,
AM. BAR ASS'N, SOURCEBOOK ON LEGAL WRITING PROGRAMS 13 (1997).
34 BRILL, ET AL., supra note 33, at 14-15. The writing curriculum at some schools, like

ours, includes a civil pretrial writing course in the second semester in which students engage in various pretrial writing exercises based on a hypothetical case file. Although legal
research and legal writing are two separate skills, there is certainly significant overlap between the two, and they are often taught in conjunction. A survey of legal writing courses
conducted by the Association of Legal Writing Directors and the Legal Writing Institute in
2003 asked, "How do you teach legal research in your program?" One hundred twentyeight respondents replied "integrated with writing," while forty-nine responded "taught
separate from writing." Ass'N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & LEGAL WRITING INST., 2003

SURVEY

RESULTS 8 (2003),

available at http://www.alwd.org/alwdResources/surveys/

2003survey/PDFfiles/lcoverpageadhighlights2003survey.pdf. At any rate, legal research
and legal writing can never be truly separated; for the purposes of this article, "legal research and writing" is largely considered a single concept.
35 Silecchia, supra note 31, at 258 (footnotes omitted). "[F]orty-three" of the 111 respondents to the LRW survey "would like to have more time to teach 'additional skills,'"
with "professional responsibility and legal ethics ranked among the most popular [of the
suggestions for additional skills]." Id. at 263.
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LRW courses. 36 Lucia Silecchia recommends a midpoint model that
adds to the core skills those additional skills and topics that arise natu-

rally from the context of the assignments and the nature of the writing. 37 We believe it is possible to use actual legal work in much the
same way, but to greater benefit. The focus remains on the core skills.
Through the legal work, the teacher and students use experience to

explore related skills, professional responsibility and justice issues,

38
and credibly to critique law and process.
These are not new ideas. In 1947, a parent of clinical education,
Judge Jerome Frank, skewered legal education for its excessive reliance on the appellate case method. 3 9 Many view Frank's recommen-

36 For a summary of some of the arguments on both sides of the debate, see id. at 26583. For additional arguments in favor of limited LRW courses, see, for example, Donald J.
Dunn, Why Legal Research Skills Declined, or When Two Rights Make a Wrong, 85 LAW
LiBR. J. 49 (1993); Robin K. Mills, Legal Research Instruction in Law Schools, The State of
the Art or, Why Law School GraduatesDo Not Know How to Find the Law, 70 LAW LIBR.
J. 343 (1977); Helene S. Shapo, The Frontiers of Legal Writing: Challenges for Teaching
Research, 78 LAW LIBR. J. 719, 720 (1986). For additional arguments in favor of expanded
LWR courses, see, for example, Charles R. Halpern, A New Direction in Legal Education:
The CUNY Law School at Queens College, 10 NOVA L.J. 549 (1986); MACCRATE REPORT,
supra note 29; Philip N. Meyer, "Fingers Pointing at the Moon": New Perspectives on
Teaching Legal Writing and Analysis, 25 CONN. L. REV. 777 (1993).
37 Silecchia, supra note 31, at 287-88. As a "context" example, she says that "a study of
fact development in a case might" help "students write about facts, draw analogies between the facts of their problem and precedents, and discern where the factual gaps in their
writing are." Id. at 288. As a "nature-of-the-writing" example, she notes that "a writing
project involving a complaint is a logical opportunity for a discussion of the ethical rules
governing complaints, court rules dictating drafting form, filing deadlines, choice of forum,
pre-trial discovery and so on." Id. at 286-87.
38 For other descriptions of the features of today's LRW courses, see, for example, Jo
Anne Durako, A Snapshot of Legal Writing Programsat the Millennium, 6 LEGAL WRITING 95 (2000); Kristin B. Gerdy, Continuing Development: A Snapshot of Legal Research
and Writing Programs through the Lens of the 2002 LWI and ALWD Survey, 9 LEGAL
WRITING 227 (2003); Jan M. Levine, Legal Research and Writing: What Schools Are Doing,
and Who Is Doing the Teaching, 7 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 51 (1998-2000); Susan P.
Liemer & Jan M. Levine, Legal Research and Writing: What Schools Are Doing, and Who
Is Doing the Teaching (Three Years Later), 9 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 113 (2003-2004).
To explore some of the hybrid courses, see, for example, Debra Harris & Susan D. Susman,
Toward a More Perfect Union: Using Lawyering Pedagogy to Enhance Legal Writing
Courses, 49 J. LEGAL Eouc. 185 (1999) (describing educational benefits of adding instruction on lawyering skills to a LRW course, including more effective writing and better understanding of the relationship between law and facts); Nancy M. Maurer & Linda Fitts
Mischler, Introduction to Lawyering: Teaching First-Year Students to Think Like Professionals, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 96 (1994) (describing a course developed by the authors which
sought to integrate elements of a clinical legal studies program and a traditional LWR

program by using an elaborate hypothetical). See generally Arturo L6pez Torres, MacCrate
Goes to Law Schook An Annotated Bibliographyof Methods for Teaching Lawyering Skills
in the Classroom, 77 NEB. L. REV. 132 (1998) (providing bibliography of articles that purport to integrate lawyering skills into traditional law school courses; bibliography organized according to the ten fundamental lawyering skills identified in the MacCrate Report).
39 He said: "American legal education went badly wrong some seventy years ago when
it was seduced by a brilliant neurotic." He was referring to "the well-known founder of the
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dations as an early blueprint for clinical education. 40 His words,
however, also describe the value of teaching legal research and writing
with actual legal work.
Frank urged law schools to immerse their students in the world.
"If it were not for a tradition which blinds us, would we not consider it
ridiculous that, with litigation laboratories [courthouses] just around
the corner, law schools confine their students to what they can learn
about litigation in books?"' 41 Today, practice laboratories are closer
than "just around the corner;" they are inside the law schools themselves in the forms of clinical courses, programs and law offices. These
should be laboratoriesfor LRW courses.
As a start, Frank suggested that law schools supplement the case
method with "one or two elaborate court records, including the briefs
[in the cases] ....,42 Frank warned, however, that case histories have
their limits. "At best, dissection of court records would merely approximate the cadavers which first-year medical students learn to
dissect."

43

Frank proposed that each law school develop "a legal clinic", like
the clinics and dispensaries in medical schools, 4 4 and he recommended
that students help to prepare "briefs, both for trial courts and on appeals," to "learn legal rules and doctrines in the exciting context of
live cases."'4 5 He contended that "[t]he difference is indescribable between that way of learning and that to which students are now re46
stricted in the schools."
so-called case system, Christopher Columbus Langdell." Jerome Frank, A Pleafor LawyerSchools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303, 1303 (1947). Frank emphasized that he was not recommending
that law schools "produce mere legal technicians," id. at 1312, or return to the "old system" of legal apprenticeships. Id. at 1313. Instead, Frank urged law schools only to "repuId.
I..."
Frank made his
diate Langdell's morbid repudiation of actual legal practice .
comments at the dinner of a conference on legal education that law students organized and
"125 law students, representing forty-two law schools" attended. Harold W. Solomon, National Law Student Conference, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 68, 68 (1948). Solomon says the conference "was perhaps the most ambitious enterprise ever undertaken by law students in the
United States." Id.
40 See, e.g., Barry, Dubin & Joy, supra note 8, at 8; Suzanne Valdez Carey, An Essay on
the Evolution of Clinical Legal Education and Its Impact on Student Trial Practice, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 509, 513-15 (2003); Stephen Wizner, The Law School Clinic: Education in the
Interests of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1929, 1932-33 (2002).
41 Frank, supra note 39, at 1311.
42 Id.

at 1315.

43 Id. Frank considered mock trials, which he called "fake" trials, to be both useful and
limited in the same way: "They are not the equivalent of serious lawyer-work." Id. at 1316.
44 Id. at 1316. In describing what he meant, Frank sketched the outlines of many of
today's clinical law programs.
45 Id. at 1317.

46 Id. Frank also urged law schools to teach "'creative draftsmanship,'-the use of
novel fact-materials thrown at the lawyer by his client and sometimes worked out in negotiations with counsel representing the other party to the bargain ...." Id. at 1318.
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In developing our two experimental LRW courses, we built on
Frank's conception of the best way to teach legal research and writing
offered over half a century ago, as well as on the many successful and
diversified forms of clinical teaching that have been developed since
then.
C.

Criticisms of Today's LRW Courses

Some criticize LRW courses because they do not teach law students to write well. 47 Since writing is a skill developed through repetition and experience, we are dubious that one, two, or even three
courses, by themselves, can make students polished legal writers.
Commentators offer a variety of reasons for lawyers' writing deficiencies. They point out that "it is only in the last fifteen to twenty
years that law schools have begun to see the importance of rigorous
legal writing courses. '' 48 Still, today, many "law schools devalue legal
writing classes."'49 These courses often have "second-class status," as
"evidenced by the staffing models [for legal writing courses], pay inequity, and professional status disparities [of legal writing teachers] at
many law schools today."' 50 This message of devaluation is particularly damaging given that LRW courses often are the "only true opportunity for students to practice the sorts of writing and advocacy
51
skills they will need ... as attorneys."
We believe these structural problems are amplified by the predominant LRW method: basing writing exercises on canned problems.
The canned problem usually is a complex hypothetical involving imaginary parties and legal issues. It can come from a commercially pub47 The critics rely on writing-proficiency surveys, including a recent survey of judges,
lawyers and legal writing teachers, which finds "widespread agreement that new lawyers do
not write well." Susan Hanley Kosse & David T. ButleRitchie, How Judges, Practitioners,
and Legal Writing Teachers Assess the Writing Skills of New Law Graduates:A Comparative Study, 53 J. LEGAL EDuC. 80, 80 (2003). Over fifty-seven percent of the respondents
"thought that new members of the profession do not write well." Id. at 86. Among the
major problems cited by the survey were the failures of new lawyers in their writing to
develop a coherent theory of the case and to be persuasive. Id. We believe, as we explain
below, that practice-based writing offers students better opportunities to develop these
particular competencies.
48 Id. at 93.
49 Id. at 94.
50 Id. at 95.
51 Id. See also Kenneth D. Chestek, Reality ProgrammingMeets LRW: The Moot Case
Approach to Teaching in the First Year, 38 GoNz. L. REV. 57, 58 (2002) (noting that "some
students think of [the legal research and writing course] as an anomaly, unworthy of the
same level of attention as the other more 'substantive' courses"); Terrill Pollman, Building
a Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline?: Talking About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L.
REV. 887, 910 (2002) (observing that "legal writing has enjoyed less respect in the legal
academy than other areas of instruction"); Trail & Underwood, supra note 28, at 235-36.
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lished "case file," 52 a well-known case with notable legal issues, or a
53
teacher's imagination.
In contrast to actual legal problems, there are four important features of the type of canned problem that we have in mind. First, even
if based on an actual case, the "clients" are not real people and the
"facts" are hypothetical. Second, the problems are carefully balanced
and controlled to focus students' development narrowly on discrete
analysis and basic communication skills. This is a highly simplified environment, free of many of the complications of practice. Third, the
problems are the product of a kind of reverse engineering in which the
teacher creates the canned problem by working backwards from the
relevant authorities and arguments. The "question" posed to the students is thus derived in substantial part from the pre-determined "answer." Fourth, the research and writing that the problem generates
54
will not be used to represent an existing or future client.
This traditional approach to teaching legal writing is understandable given the structural problems and limitations mentioned above,
including large classes taught by undervalued and estranged writing
faculty or over-extended adjunct faculty. These faculty members quite
reasonably adopt problems that permit them to teach basic skills to
many students in a pedagogically sound way.
Ironically, however, this approach reinforces the structural
problems. A writing curriculum based on hypothetical cases, divorced
(at least formally) from the doctrinal and clinical curricula, tends to
alienate the writing faculty and devalue their work. Educational partnerships between clinical and LRW faculty should help to enhance the
institutional status, and support the educational goals, of both sets of
faculty. While our proposal does not seek directly to remedy the
structural problems, we believe a secondary effect of it may be to help
to break this self-perpetuating cycle.
Our critique of the prevalent model of the canned problem follows from its features.
1.

Hypothetical Clients and Facts
The problem may incorporate timely legal issues that are "real"
52 See, e.g., DAVID W. MILLER, MICHAEL VITIELLO & MICHAEL R. FONTHAM, PRAC-

I (2002); CASE FILE II
(2003); CASE FILE III (2005). The National Institute for Trial Advocacy ("NITA"), among
other organizations, also publishes canned case files upon which legal research and writing
problems are based.
53 For example, a great resource for legal writing faculty designing appellate advocacy
problems is the "Circuit Split" section of U.S. Law Week. Writing faculty create hypothetical trial records that raise these issues on appeal.
54 See infra Part I(B).
1ICING PERSUASIVE WRIrEN AND ORAL ADVOCACY: CASE FILE

Spring 20061

Teaching Legal Research

in someone else's case. They may be topical. However, neither the
writing faculty nor the students have any relationship to the actual
case, and the canned problem has no real connection to the faculty or
the students.
Legal writing faculty using this approach can go to great lengths
to create "realistic" facts that mirror those of cases that a young lawyer might encounter in practice. They may develop extensive hypothetical records with factual complexity and indeterminacy that
approach that of real cases. The imaginary parties and witnesses may
possess the rich personalities and diverse characteristics of real people. The faculty may even make actual cases-their own, or othersthe bases of their problems. Or, they may draw upon a small market
of outside contractors who design factually rich problems for use in
legal writing programs, or use a growing commercial publishing market in hypothetical case files. 55 They may even use actors to play the
roles of parties or witnesses to introduce a "human" element into an
otherwise impersonal paper record.
We do not contend that these efforts are without value. Students
may become more involved in a writing project when it closely mirrors
reality or touches on issues they care about. And this may translate
into more engaged learning. One informal measure of this occurs
when students start talking about their imaginary clients as if they
were real people. When this happens, the vigor and energy in the
class-and, more importantly, the learning-can be enhanced.
In short, writing faculty go to great and admirable lengths to
make their problems realistic, but they stop conspicuously short of
making them real. Taking the extra step adds substantial educational
value, we believe.
Even if they are based on actual people, purely hypothetical "clients" have little of the teaching potential of actual clients. We believe
the valid criticisms that Ann Shalleck directs at classroom courses apply to many canned problems in LRW courses as well. She argues that
the non-clinical curriculum "strips the clients of individual identity,
wiping out any of their unique understandings of, or experiences in,
the world."' 56 As they do with clients in casebooks, "[p]rofessors and
students easily presume agreement as to who [clients in canned
problems] are and what they want." Hypothetical clients are "unproblematic figures. ' 57 Even when they are well-formed-hypothetically, at least-these clients "are seen as having subjective,
55 See, e.g., MILLER ET AL., supra note 52.
56 Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV.

1731, 1733 (1993).
57 Id. at 1731.
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determinate, articulated interests constituted prior to their interactions with a lawyer. '58 That is, "[t]hese clients come to lawyers already
knowing what they want. The job of the lawyer is to discover what
these clients want and, having identified their desires, to offer choices
59
about how to achieve their legitimate goals within the legal system.

By definition, hypothetical clients cannot interact with the students, or
give students a sense of real responsibility for the life, liberty, or prop60
erty of another.
Angela Campbell questions whether canned problems can ade-

quately motivate students to do their best work. She points out that
"[w]riting teachers have suggested that one reason many students do
not write well in class is that they place little importance on classroom

assignments," and argues that "[s]tudents are more motivated to write
when they feel that a task must be accomplished and when they believe their writing will be taken seriously. ' 61 She recommends courses
that combine legal clinics with law school writing and research programs because "[tihe real world consequences of the clinic give stu62
dents strong incentives to improve their writing.

Peter Hoffman contends that "simulation cannot approximate the

'63
greater factual richness and uncertainty introduced by real cases."
We agree. In simulations, fictional clients become unnaturally sanitized, stripped of social context, and denied complexities that make
64
live clients and actual matters interesting, challenging, and real.

We also agree with Campbell that "[a]ctual cases can provide
data for the study and critique of issues involving professional responsibility and the legal system in general.
58

'65

By comparison, hypotheti-

Id. at 1738.

59 Id.

60 Id. at 1731. There are teaching problems that contain comprehensive descriptions of
clients, including actual clients in real cases, and include related teaching materials that
introduce students to these clients in effective ways, e.g., through videotaped interviews,
transcripts of testimony, and written accounts (including by clients). We acknowledge that
these can help to bring clients, and their perspectives, into classroom courses.
61 Angela J. Campbell, Teaching Advanced Legal Writing in a Law School Clinic, 24
SETON HALL L. REV. 653, 659-60 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
62 Id. at 659. There is a "common complaint of law students that they feel alienated
from their writing in law school and that they have little personal investment in it." J.
Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REV.
35, 51 (1994).
63 Peter Toll Hoffman, Clinical Course Design and the Supervisory Process, 1982 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 277, 291 (1982).
64 A very similar complaint is also frequently lodged at another standard of the law
school curriculum: the Socratic Method, with its focus on appellate opinions, in which facts
are similarly static and sanitized.
65 Campbell, supra note 61, at 658-59 (footnotes omitted). We acknowledge that a single client's story has its limits in performing the critiquing function. With additional information that indicates the ways in which it is representative, it can be more broadly useful.
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cal clients and cases generally do not provide credible bases for
analyzing access-to-justice or pro bono issues, or for critiquing law and
systems of justice. Rebecca Cochran argues that LRW instructors are
well positioned to deal with these issues:
LRW courses already explore the lawyering skills essential to legal
competence in practice. Within this context, the same faculty can
use the skills experience to consider the ethical issues arising from
entering into the profession, issues which are foremost in first-year
students' minds. LRW faculty undisputedly have the first, best
chance to 66link professional skills training to professional ethics
"training."
Cochran also describes the missed opportunity to engage LRW
students in work that could help others and in the process motivate
and reward students:
[A]s I walked around the library [after the assignment was completed], I felt frustrated by the evanescence of the entire process.
Once the assignment was turned in, the students, quite understandably, cleared out the masses of notes, copies, and printouts of their
materials ....
Not only was the research wasted, but in some sense, the intensity that drives the research [and] also drives first-year students to
grapple with the essential issues of why and how to be a good lawyer had also been lost. The project was, after all, just a simulation,
'67
not "real."
The emptiness that some students feel after working on a traditional LRW assignment is only part of the loss. The considerable effort that students give to canned problems does not benefit anyone
other than the students, and it benefits them only in a narrow sense.
They have not helped others who badly need it, and therefore have
not experienced the self-satisfaction and professional growth that
come from helping another.
We believe teaching a LRW course with actual legal work-i.e.,
taking that next step from realistic to real problem-avoids many of
these problems. It allows the teacher to engage students fully, teach
core LRW skills effectively, introduce students to professional responsibility and access-to-justice issues, and provide legal help to unrepresented and under- represented clients.
2.

Balance and Control from Reverse Engineering
The canned problem that we have in mind features balance and

66 Rebecca A. Cochran, Legal Research and Writing Programsas Vehicles for Law Student Pro Bono Service, 8 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 429, 446 (1999).
67 Id.

at 439.
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control. There are equally persuasive arguments on both sides of the
legal question (balance), because the facts and legal authorities are
limited (control). These are characteristics of canned problems
whether students write a "predictive" memo or "persuasive" brief.
The balance and control are created through reverse engineering.
The creator forges the analytical paths retrospectively, working from
the legal authorities, the analysis, and the arguments, back to the facts.
This pre-establishes a limited number (perhaps just one) of acceptable
pathways for the students to follow. As part of this reverse engineerfor the students is defined by the pre-determined
ing, the "question"
"answer. '68 And when the students' authorities, analysis, and arguments comport with the teacher's expectations (i.e., when the students' prospective paths fall more or less in line with the faculty
member's retrospective paths), we say that the problem has "worked."
There are sound reasons for reverse engineering and the balance
and control it produces. It creates workable hypothetical cases without any surprises, such as unexpected (and intractable) legal authority.69 It also allows students to develop skills incrementally and
provides a uniform basis for evaluation.
But this approach comes with significant drawbacks. Most important, it encourages students to find, rather than construct, legal arguments. Having created a limited set of acceptable pathways to an
established answer, the LRW faculty member largely has predetermined the outcomes. Students begin with the assumption that there
are pre-established legal arguments in every canned problem. They
are embodied in a pre-selected and limited set of case decisions. The
goal is to find the "right" set of decisions and thereby to find the
"right" answers.
These features give the canned problem the hallmarks of a scavenger hunt, with the same payoff: a prize (high grade) to the winner.
In the process, students will learn and develop good "retrieval" skills.
They will learn how to conduct basic research and find legal authorities. Once they find the authorities, they will apply them to the predetermined facts and make the best arguments they can.
In actual legal work, however, there is no preplanned design, no
"higher intelligence" (i.e., that of a professor) behind the problem.
Instead, it is the lawyer's intelligence-in our case, the student's intel68 We use "question" here to denote the issues in the problem; we use "answer" to
denote the range of acceptable authorities, the material facts, the arguments, and the reasonable theories on either side of the case-the various paths of analysis and argumentation for and against-not the more narrow and colloquial sense of the term answer.
69 Many LRW faculty also control for deviations from the paths by assigning an outside
"checker" (such as a student research assistant) to work the penultimate iteration of the
problem forward. Any unanticipated deviations can then be controlled in the final version.
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ligence-that counts. The lawyer must use that intelligence to build
arguments through a dialectical process in which facts, legal authority,
policies, strategic considerations, and client goals interact. Lawyers
describe this as "making a case" by building a factual record (in the
hypothetical, it is more or less static) and creating a legal strategy (in
the hypothetical, it has been predetermined). To do these things, students need to learn how to create balance (at least, counter-balance in
facts and arguments) and control, which they cannot do when they are
given both.
In the end, many canned problems discourage students from developing alternative factual theories, legal arguments, and theories of
the case, and ill-equip them to work with uncertainty and indeterminacy, as they must in practice. That is, they discourage creativity. Students learn to trace paths, not to forge them.
Moreover, this approach reinforces the teacher-centric model
that underlies most of the first-year curriculum. It casts the teacher as
the source of knowledge (here, the paths to the "answer"), and students as "discoverers" of the teacher's knowledge. 70 With reverse engineering, the canned problem has the hallmarks of a grand semesterlong Socratic dialogue, with all the attendant pedagogical baggage,
e.g., students do not assume control of the exercise; they tend to become passive, rather than active participants; and they are more likely
to become disengaged.
3. Research and Writing of No Value to Others
Every year, hundreds of law professors make research and writing assignments to thousands of first- and second-year students, who
spend tens of thousands of hours on them. At the end of this process,
the professors grade the papers, return them to the students, and discard their copies. This is an extraordinary waste, akin to gratuitously
destroying food in a community that has many malnourished and hun71
gry people.
It also sends disturbing messages to our students and to the communities in which our schools are located: that we do not believe law
students have the ability to produce work that is useful to others, or
that we cannot find ways to put their work to good use. These are
70 Seen in this light, the approach bears more than a passing resemblance to the "banking" theory of education, so roundly criticized by Paulo Freire, among other progressive
educators. See PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 52-67 (Myra Bergman Ramos trans., Continuum Press 2000) (1970) (comparing the "banking" concept of education,
which features spoon-feeding answers to students that they later can "withdraw" from their
individual "banks" when needed, with "problem posing" education, which features a
problem-solving method).
71 See supra note 3 for summary of unmet legal needs in the United States.
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implicit, not explicit messages, but, we agree with Howard Lesnick
72
that "much of what we teach is taught implicitly.
In any of the four course models that we identify in the introduction, which base LRW assignments on actual legal work, students can
effectively learn basic skills (and more), while producing work that
can be helpful to others.
Before we move on, we consider the general defense of canned
problems that "students must walk before they can run," and that
canned problems teach them to walk.
We accept that hypothetical problems may be a reasonable way
to teach basic aspects of legal research and writing, at least initially, in
the same way that scales are a reasonable first step in learning to play
the piano. But this speaks to the perceived need for such assignments
in the first semester, or perhaps in the first half of the first semester.
Moreover, it would be possible, even at these early stages, to base
assignments on actual legal work that has the characteristics of canned
problems, i.e., controlled facts and limited legal issues. This would allow students to focus on rudimentary skills, but in a course that is
enriched in the other ways we identify.
In second-semester and upper-level writing courses, the "walkbefore-you-run" argument loses much of its steam. Assuming control
is pedagogically useful, the LRW teacher can retain a significant measure of it by carefully selecting and preparing the actual legal work; at
the same time, the teacher can use the legal work to reinforce the
idealism and enthusiasm for practice that many students bring with
them to school.
The standard curriculum perpetuates the illusion that the legal
world is orderly, rational, and controlled. Canned problems reinforce
this illusion. We then expect students to cope intuitively with, and
bring order to, the disorderly world they will find in practice.
We take the next steps in our argument by describing the two
experimental LRW courses that we taught with actual legal work.

72 Howard Lesnick, Infinity in a Grain of Sand: The World of Law and Lawyering as
Portrayed in the Clinical Teaching Implicit in the Law School Curriculum, 37 UCLA L.

1157, 1158 (1990). We accept that resources are limited. It does not, however, require
much in the way of additional resources to consult.with others about ways in which LRW
course products might be useful to those who need help. It does take time to convert legal
work, including outside projects, into appropriate assignments for LRW students. But,
some of this is time LRW teachers would spend developing or revising canned problems,
and we believe the extra work is well worth it. See infra Part III(B)(1).
REV.
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USING ACTUAL LEGAL WORK TO TEACH LEGAL RESEARCH
AND WRITING COURSES:

Two

EXPERIMENTS AT THE

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND SCHOOL OF LAW

A.

Legal Analysis, Writing and Research III

We taught this appellate advocacy course in fall semester, 2003.
The standard course description says that "[s]ynthesizing what they
have learned in the earlier courses, the students research and write an
appellate brief and deliver an oral argument on the brief." This final
(and third) course in the LAWR sequence is "taught in the fall semester of the second year" and "coordinated with the fall competition of
73
the Moot Court program.
1.

The Students

We did not select the students, nor did they take the course
knowing it would be taught with an actual case. It was only after registration that we decided to co-teach this course and to use actual legal
work to do so. When the students enrolled in the course, they thought
74
Schwinn would be teaching it by himself.
About half of our twenty-seven students were contemporaneously enrolled in other experiential courses. 75 Before we decided to
co-teach the course, Schwinn had encouraged students who would be
taking experiential courses at the same time to register for his LAWR
III course. He intended to tailor the course to accommodate their
clinical obligations. Since all day division students at our law school
are required to take an experiential course as a condition of graduation, 76 the recruitment of students taking experiential courses did not
mean that these students were more predisposed than others to accept
our experiment. Ironically, adding actual legal work to the LAWR III
course increased rather than decreased the workloads of the experiential-course students, nullifying Schwinn's original purpose in recruiting
73 This description came from the then-existing Course Catalog of University of Maryland School of Law. The course we taught combined two sections of LAWR III. Students
who participate in the Moot Court competition are required to write an additional brief
and to present additional oral arguments.
74 Third semester students have a right, depending on their "priority number," to select
a section of LAWR III. There were ten LAWR III sections offered to students in fall 2003,
listed by teacher and time slot, including the double section Schwinn was scheduled to
teach. After the students registered for the course, and during a period when they could
have dropped the course, Schwinn notified the students that the course would include actual legal work and that Millemann would co-teach it. One student dropped it, apparently
for unrelated reasons.
75 Of the twenty-seven students who enrolled in our course, nine were taking clinical
courses and four more were enrolled in Legal Theory and Practice courses. See supra note
19.
76 See supra note 19.
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those students.
2. Selecting the Legal Work
We selected the case that we intended to use to teach the fall
77
course in the preceding summer. The client was Nathanial Anthony.
Millemann also created a post-conviction clinic to respond to
Anthony's request for legal assistance, as well as to requests from several other prisoners who had meritorious claims, including credible
claims of innocence. 78 Thus, we developed the experimental LAWR
III course and the new post-conviction clinic in tandem, with the stu79
dents in each working together.
a.

The Anthony Case

Anthony was arrested in 1968 when he was nineteen-years old,
and charged with felony murder. At the time, this was a capital offense. He had never been arrested or in trouble before. He was convicted after a bench trial that lasted about half a day. The trial
80
transcript was a total of ninety-three pages.
In sum, the facts were these. Alan Johnson, a young man who was
intoxicated on drugs and alcohol, murdered a randomly selected pedestrian with a baseball bat during a robbery. Before the homicide,
five youths, including Johnson and Anthony, had been together in a
house near the crime scene. The state indicted all five youths for
murder.
The key testimony in Anthony's case came from one of the five
indicted youths, Edward Hollis, who was thirteen-years old at the time
of the crime. He testified that after Anthony left the house, Johnson
talked briefly about robbing someone.8 1 Then, Johnson, with bat in his
77 The name is fictitious, as are the names of all of the participants in this case who are
described in this article.
78 Initially, Millemann co-taught the clinic with Michele Nethercott, an assistant state
public defender who directs that office's innocence project. Later, he co-taught the clinic
with Renee Hutchins, a newly hired professor. Both supervised students who worked on
the Anthony case and helped to represent Anthony.
79 See infra Part II(A)(1)(i).

80 Trial transcript. The information about the Anthony case comes from records of pretrial and related proceedings, the trial and sentencing transcripts, the transcript of the hearing on Anthony's motion for a new trial, the trial judge's decision, appellate records
including the appellate briefs, the appellate decision, the pro se pleadings that Anthony
filed after the appellate decision, and the decisions in those proceedings [hereinafter Case
Record].
81 Trial transcript. Before Hollis testified at Anthony's trial, he testified at the trial of a
co-defendant whom Anthony's lawyer also represented. In both trials, he was a prosecution witness, and in both, he testified that Anthony had left the house before Johnson
made his comments about mugging someone. At Anthony's trial, Hollis also testified, inconsistently, that Johnson began talking about mugging someone as Anthony was leaving,
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hand, ran out of the house after a pedestrian. The other three youths

followed Johnson. Anthony was standing in front of a store about a
block or so away. He trailed the others up the street to see what was
happening. As he ran up the street, he saw Johnson hit the victim over
the head with the bat. After he arrived, it is clear that Anthony did
nothing whatsoever to assist Johnson. Anthony testified that he pulled
82
Johnson off the victim.

Anthony's mother paid $300 to the lawyer who represented
Anthony at trial. 83 The lawyer was known for his lack of preparation,

bragging that the only documents he brought with him to trial were
84
those he could carry in his sports coat pockets.
In a conflict of interest, Anthony's lawyer also represented one of
the co-defendants who had helped to rob the victim. A judge severed
the two trials, and, after a bench trial, acquitted that co-defendant of
85
felony murder.

A different judge tried Anthony. 86 Anthony's lawyer called no
witnesses, other than Anthony, 87 although there were several who we
believe would have given exculpatory testimony. The judge concluded

that although there was no evidence that Anthony had done anything
to assist Johnson, he believed Anthony was prepared to help if necessary and may have acted as a look-out. 88 These conclusions, however,
89
were contradicted by the evidence.
but he added that Anthony did not know what Johnson was talking about. Hollis was
unequivocal in his testimony that Anthony did nothing to assist Johnson when Anthony
arrived at the scene. Id.
82 Id. Anthony did nothing to assist Johnson when Anthony arrived at the scene. Both
Anthony and Hollis testified that all five of the youths, including Anthony, went back to
the house after the incident. Hollis, whose charges were dismissed after he testified in
Anthony's case, said that Johnson gave some of the change taken from the victim to the
others, including Anthony. Anthony testified that Johnson offered change to him, but that
he refused it.
83 Statement of Anthony's mother.
84 Millemann practiced at the same time as this lawyer, observed him in court on several occasions, and talked to a number of lawyers and judges who had first-hand information about this lawyer.
85 Case Record, supra note 80.
86 Id. Anthony's lawyer directed Anthony to waive a jury trial, "explaining" to
Anthony that it was clear that he was innocent and therefore a jury trial was unnecessary.
We believe the lawyer made this decision for reasons of economic self-interest, i.e., he did
not want to spend the time it would have taken to impanel a jury and try the case to that
jury.
87 Trial transcript. The lawyer's primary argument was that since the first judge had
acquitted the co-defendant, the second judge was bound to acquit Anthony, an argument
that lacked legal merit and may well have antagonized Anthony's judge.
88 Trial transcript and transcript of hearing on motion for a new trial.
89 Id. For example, Anthony left the house before Johnson made his comments about
"mugging" someone; he went in the opposite direction of the eventual robbery; Johnson
was high on drugs, and apparently decided to go after the victim on the spur-of-the-mo-
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The court sentenced Anthony to imprisonment for life, believing,
erroneously we think, that it had no power to suspend all or part of
the sentence. There were compelling grounds, in addition to the facts
of the incident, to suspend all or part of the sentence. 90
Anthony's trial lawyer sought appointment and was appointed to
represent Anthony on appeal. (The case predated the creation of Maryland's public defender program.) The lawyer wrote a brief that contained inaccuracies, grammatical errors, conclusory arguments, and a
total of two case citations. In the third and last argument, which was a
page and a half long, the lawyer contended that there was insufficient
evidence to support the conviction. 91
Maryland's intermediate appellate court affirmed the conviction,
deferring to the trial court's conclusions, despite the contrary evidence. Anthony's lawyer failed to file a certiorari petition in the
state's highest court, although a then-applicable state rule required
92
him to do so or help Anthony to do so.
With the assistance of fellow prisoners, Anthony subsequently
filed two pro se pleadings. Although he had a number of meritorious
claims, the pleadings were incompetently prepared and were
93
unsuccessful.
Anthony became a model prisoner and by the early 1990s he was
living in a minimum security prison, working outside the prison (on
work release), and living at home with his mother on weekends.
In 1993, however, in response to a murder by another work-release inmate, the governor of Maryland revoked the minimum security status of all life-sentenced murderers, and a subsequent governor
adopted a no-parole policy for them. 94 As a consequence, Anthony
was transferred back to a maximum security prison and subsequently
was denied parole despite the unanimous recommendation of the Parole Commission that he be paroled.
In late 2002, Anthony requested assistance from Millemann, who
read his ninety-three-page trial transcript and was shocked by the apment; Anthony followed the group up one street, around a corner, and up a second street,
rather than remaining at the intersection where he could have "looked out" for police;
Anthony was not looking around, calling out information to Johnson, acting in any respect
like a look-out, or assisting in any other way; and Johnson was openly brandishing a baseball bat, with no apparent concern about being seen. Id.
90 Id. Anthony had no record. At the time of the crime, he was employed, and was
living at home with and helping to support his mother. Anthony had learning problems and
had "aged out" of high school in the 10th grade.
91 Appellate brief.
92 See MD. R. 719(b)(7)(b) (1971) (repealed 1972).
93 Case Record, supra note 80.
94 See Watkins v. Sec'y, Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 831 A.2d 1079 (Md. 2003)
(upholding the constitutionality of the policies).
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parent miscarriage of justice. We were convinced that Anthony had
viable post-conviction claims and decided to make these claims the
basis of the assignments in the LAWR course. Later, we converted the
students' work into a clemency petition.
b. Deciding to Use the Anthony Case to Teach Appellate
Advocacy
A post-conviction proceeding is a hybrid. 95 Although it is an extension of the criminal process, many states consider it to be a civil
proceeding. 96 It can be based both on facts in the trial and appellate
97
records and on new facts established after trial and appeal.
A post-conviction proceeding follows the direct appeal. 9 8 It therefore may seem counter-intuitive to use a post-conviction case to teach
an appellate advocacy course. We found, however, that the fit between
the Anthony case and our LAWR III objectives was excellent in most
respects.
The record in Anthony's case was fixed in some respects and fluid
in others. It included the historical documents, 99 but we added a dynamic feature by connecting the LAWR III course to the post-conviction clinic. As the LAWR III students analyzed the existing record,
they identified additional facts they wanted to know, and transmitted
their requests for information to the post-conviction clinic students.
The clinic students, who were doing additional factual research, sometimes knew the answers to the questions. If they did not, they often
conducted the additional investigation necessary to answer the
questions.
This process produced several categories of information: 1) information an appellate party can add to the record through rules allowing parties to supplement the record or courts to take judicial
notice of facts; 2) information that can not be added to the record, but
is relevant in interpreting facts already in the record; and 3) information that can not be shoe-horned, post facto, into an appeal, but rather
can be asserted in a new or reopened post-conviction proceeding.
The process, therefore, not only engaged the students in the
search for the truth (what actually happened), but also helped us to
explore the different rules governing trial, appellate, and post-conviction evidence.
95 See 1 DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF § 1-

5, at 16-18 (2001 ed.).
96 Id.

97 Id. § 1-7, at 34-36; §1-13, at 53-61.

Id. § 1-5, at 18.
99 See supra note 80.
98
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At a mid-point in the semester, we froze the "record" in the
LAWR III course, although the post-conviction students continued

their investigations. Where there were factual gaps, we supplemented
the record with a limited number of "stipulated" facts. This gave the
LAWR III students a fixed and uniform evidentiary foundation for

their briefs. We thus struck a balance between the competing educational interests in fixed and fluid records.
The nature of the post-conviction process also made the Anthony
case good teaching material for our appellate advocacy course. The
process begins with the legal equivalent of an autopsy. In our case, the

"body" was the Anthony litigation, from arrest through trial, appeal,
and post-appellate litigation. This helped the students to understand
the role of the appeal in the criminal process and its relationship to

the other steps in the process.
Common post-conviction claims include ineffective assistance of
counsel, the prosecution's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence,

and violations of other "fundamental rights," such as the right to jury
trial, that only can be waived personally and on the record by the
defendant. 1°° Anthony had meritorious claims like these, as well as

others. In post-conviction practice, however, the rules governing procedural default are as important and at least as complicated as those
governing substantive claims. 10 1 The students had to deal with these

issues as well.
To evaluate the legal claims, the students had to ask, with legally

required deference to Anthony's prior lawyer's judgments, whether
counsel's performance before, at, and after trial and appeal, was "'deficient,'"102 and if so, whether counsel's "'deficient performance

prejudiced the defense."1 0 3 To answer these questions, the students
had to understand the criminal process and the normative standards

of criminal defense (today and in 1969 and 1970, the years of the trial
100 1

WILKES, JR.,

supra note 95, § 1-11, at 46-47; Curtis v. State, 395 A.2d 464 (Md.

1978).
101 1 WILKES,

JR.,

supra note 95, § 1-7, at 34-35.

102 Gross v. State, 809 A.2d 627, 635 (Md. 2002) (quoting Wiggins v. State, 724 A.2d 1,
12 (Md. 1999)). To establish this, a petitioner "must (1) demonstrate that counsel's acts or
omissions, given the circumstances, 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
considering prevailing professional norms,' and (2) overcome the presumption that the
challenged conduct could 'be considered sound trial strategy."' Id. Accord Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-89 (1984); Bowers v. State, 578 A.2d 734, 738 (Md. 1990).
103 Gross, 809 A.2d at 635-36 (quoting Wiggins, 724 A.2d at 12). This requires more
proof than that "'the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceedings,'" but less proof than "'that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered
the outcome in the case."' Bowers, 578 A.2d at 738 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).
The test is whether there is a "substantial possibility" that counsel's errors altered the
outcome in the case. Id. at 739. For applications of these tests, see, for example, Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. State, 605 A.2d 103 (Md. 1992).
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and appeal). They had to master the record in Anthony's case and
identify with specificity what Anthony's lawyer did wrong and how it
likely affected the verdict and sentence in his case. They also had to
explain why Anthony should be able to assert these claims now, and
10 4
then had to brief and argue these and other points.

3.

Preparingto Teach with the Legal Work

There are a variety of challenges in using an actual case to teach a
non-clinical course. 10 5 One is the winnowing process of distilling
teaching material from a complicated case. We needed to limit the
parts of the Anthony case that we would use in the course and to put
10 6
those parts into usable forms.
The first step in this process was to reconstruct the record in the

case. One of the threshold obstacles in representing long-term prison-

ers is that states often destroy major parts of their case records even
while the prisoners remain confined. 10 7 We were happy to discover

that Maryland has an excellent legal archivist.' 08 With his considerable
help, we were able to obtain the central records in Anthony's case

from the archives.
We then organized these records, conducted the basic preliminary

research necessary to identify viable issues, and compiled a set of reAmong the issues in the case were these:
1. Did Anthony voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial?
2. Did Anthony's lawyer fail to provide him with the constitutionally required effective assistance of counsel on appeal by failing to adequately make the argument that there
was insufficient evidence to convict him, and then failing to advise him about his right to
seek certiorari from the Maryland Court of Appeals after the Court of Special Appeals
decided this issue against him?
3. Did the trial judge err in concluding that he had only two sentencing options, either
to sentence Anthony to death or life, and that he could not suspend all or part of the life
sentence?
4. Was counsel ineffective at trial in a variety of ways?
There also were a number of procedural issues related to whether Anthony could now
assert these claims, including whether Anthony or his lawyer had waived these claims or
whether they had been finally decided in a prior proceeding.
105 One of the major issues is how to preserve the confidences of clients, which we discuss infra, Part II(A)(7) and Part III(B)(2).
106 By comparison, there are some clinical/LRW hybrids in which the teacher can teach
with the entirety of a legal matter. Beginning fall semester, 2005, Professor Renee M.
Hutchins on our faculty is using actual criminal appeals to teach our LAWR III appellate
advocacy course. The LAWR III semester-long course is included in a year-long Appellate
and Post-Conviction Advocacy Clinic. She is teaching with the full appellate record and
process in the cases.
107 At a minimum, the law should require that a prisoner's case records be retained until
he is free from any restraint imposed in that case. See, e.g., UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN. App.
F. (Utah State Courts Records Retention Schedule).
108 Dr. Edward C. Papenfuse. He currently holds the positions of Maryland State Archivist and Commissioner of Land Patents.
104
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lated teaching materials. 10 9
4. Involving the LAWR III Students in the Case-Selection Decision
in a Limited but Important Way
Initially, the clinic, acting through Millemann, committed to investigate Anthony's case. After reading the ninety-three-page trial
transcript of this half-day capital trial, it became impossible to really
consider rejecting the case.
When we introduced the Anthony case to the LAWR III students, therefore, we knew that the post-conviction clinic, at least,
would represent Anthony. Although we planned on using the
Anthony case in the LAWR III course as well, we would have listened
to the LAWR III students if they had presented compelling arguments
in support of different legal work.
Therefore, after we discussed the basic facts of the case with the
students, we posed the question: should we-the students and the two
of us-spend our considerable resources representing Mr. Anthony?
Or, should we generate some other form of actual legal work for the
students that might benefit a larger number of people?
In the end, there was a virtual consensus that we should represent
Anthony. This was a good discussion in which we talked about the
role of a law school, especially a state school like ours, in providing
legal assistance to the poor, and the issues that arise in allocating
scarce legal resources. 110 Through this confirmation of our initial decision, the students made an initial commitment to Mr. Anthony. This
was a radically different way to begin a LRW semester, and it invested
the students in their semester's work by making them responsible, in a
limited but important way, for that work.
This commitment had important consequences for us, the teach109 Specifically, we read and excerpted the trial transcript; identified the elements of the
crime (felony murder, with robbery as the felony); evaluated the trial court's decision
(guilty of felony murder based on the "ready-to-assist" and "look out" theories); evaluated
the very summary sentencing proceeding (about one page total in the transcript); determined the results of Anthony's co-defendants' cases (one acquittal, one dismissal of
charges, and two convictions, with both of the convicted defendants-including Johnson,
who murdered the victim with the bat, having been released from prison); evaluated the
performance of trial counsel and the trial judge; read and analyzed the appeal, and evaluated the performance of appellate counsel; read and analyzed the post-appeal proceedings;
and with this information, identified and evaluated Anthony's potential claims and the
grounds to assert these claims at this stage of Anthony's case. The course materials included the core components of the record and explanatory memoranda, instructions, issue
statements, articles, statutes, and case decisions.
110 See, e.g., Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics:Confronting Scarcity and Fairnessin Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337 (1978); Paul R. Tremblay,

Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L.
(1990); Stephen Wizner, Rationing Justice, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1019.

REV.
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ers, as well. It made us accountable to our students, including for what
we taught them and for the legal services that together we would provide to Mr. Anthony. It thus helped to create a special working partnership between the students and us.
5.

Dividing the Students into Issue-Specific Workgroups and CoCounseling Teams

We identified preliminarily seven sets of substantive and procedural issues that we intended to assign to the LAWR III students. The
issue descriptions were general, leaving the students substantial room
to refine, vary, or for good reasons, discard the issue and work on
another and better one.
Many of the issues were very challenging. Students had to identify and explore several potential theories and select one. Having committed to a theory, they had to be creative with often ambiguous and
sparse legal authority. The students also had to work with an indeterminate factual record.
We structured each of the issues as a freestanding appeal. Thus,
there were seven separate appeals. The students had to identify the
portion of the total record that applied to their issue, and use that
portion of the record to develop the statement of facts in their
appeals.
We divided the twenty-seven students into seven groups, and assigned one issue to each group. We divided each group of four (in one
case three) students into two teams of two students, and we assigned
one team to represent Mr. Anthony and the other to represent the
State."1 Although "co-counsel" worked together, each was responsible for his or her own brief and each made a separate oral argument.
In what became one of the most interesting parts of the course,
we met weekly with each of the seven workgroups, which were comprised of two sets of opposing co-counsel and the student from the
post-conviction clinic who had been assigned to that workgroup. This
connected the two courses, although each largely retained a separate
identity.
We conducted these meetings as case rounds and strategy sessions. In the give and take of these meetings, the students identified
their initial "theories of the case" (really, "theories of the issue"); refined their theories; developed new theories that we had not initially
identified; and refined those theories.
In these meetings, we used facilitated group-writing (engaging the
111 Given that we had twenty-seven, not twenty-eight, students, in one of the seven
groups, only one student represented a party individually.
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class, as a whole, in exemplary writing exercises) and modified peerediting techniques (in which one student edited the work of another)
to develop argumentation and writing skills. There were high levels of
student participation and engagement, and this became the forum in
which we did our best collaborative work. Mr. Anthony benefited the
most from this issue-vetting process, which had a great dialectical
quality. 112 Clinical teachers will recognize this as a core feature of
clinical education.
6. Adding Limited Hypothetical Components to the Actual Case
We added some limited hypothetical features to the real-world
facts. This included a lower court opinion from which Anthony would
appeal. We hypothesized that Anthony had filed a post-conviction petition in which he raised seven issues. The opinion summarily denied
1 13
relief on all of the issues thereby presenting all of them for appeal.
7. Insuring Client Confidentiality
Our Clinical Law Program represented Mr. Anthony. Millemann

was the primary clinical lawyer in the case. The work of the students
in both LAWR III and the post conviction clinic was carried on within
the scope of the Clinical Law Program's attorney-client relationship

with Anthony, and was part of the work-product in the case. The students "posted" their work on a secure computer system, and they discussed the case outside the classroom only in private settings and only
114
with other students in one of the two courses.

112 For analysis of educational benefits of teacher-student dialectical learning, see, for
example, Frank S. Bloch, The AndragogicalBasis of Clinical Legal Education, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 321, 333-44 (1982); PAULO FREIRE, TEACHERS AS CULTURAL WORKERS: LETTERS TO
THOSE WHO DARE TEACH 63-68 (Donaldo Macedo et al. trans., 1998).
113 We made the appeal to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, Maryland's intermediate appellate court, which tracked the real world. (If we lost the actual case, we would
appeal the decision to that Court.) The students had to comply with the rules of that Court
in preparing their briefs.
114 See infra Part III(B)(2) for analysis of professional responsibility and liability issues.
Writing about clinic cases raises additional issues. We have been aided by Professor Nina
W. Tarr's analysis in writing this article. See Nina W. Tarr, Clients' and Students' Stories:
Avoiding Exploitation and Complying with the Law to Produce Scholarshipwith Integrity, 5
CLIN. L. REV. 271 (1998). We have done the following to protect the interests of the clients
whose cases we discuss in this article: 1) either disclosed in this article no client-identifying
information, or limited the disclosed factual information to that which appears in court
records, see supra note 80, judicial opinions, see supra notes 80, 125-26, or other public
documents; 2) assured ourselves that we have not disclosed confidential or otherwise sensitive client information or waived any applicable confidentiality privilege; 3) tested these
conclusions by submitting a copy of the final draft of this article to an ad hoc committee of
our colleagues ("Committee") for their review (the Committee agreed with our assessment); 4) provided the client whom we call Mr. Anthony with a copy of the final draft of
this article, discussed it with him, and offered to help him obtain independent counsel to
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Apportioning Teaching Responsibilities

We apportioned responsibility for the course in ways that were
consistent with our backgrounds and expertise." 5 Schwinn did the majority of the LRW teaching, and Millemann most of the teaching about
criminal law and the post-conviction process. We both, usually to-

gether, participated in the seven weekly work-group meetings. Many
of the best moments in the course occurred when we were both present and involved in the classroom and in our work-group meetings.

We often had differing perspectives, for example, on how to build
a case. We had differing styles as well. Although we both regularly
used some form of a dialectic process, Millemann tended to be more

directive and Schwinn more open-ended. Together, our two perspectives and styles offered students a range of options they could use to

make their own decisions.
9.

Coordinatingthe LAWR III Course with the Post-Conviction
Clinic

The clinical students had primary responsibility for interviewing
Anthony, maintaining the relationship with him, developing the facts
in the case, and drafting the pleadings. The LAWR III students did
legal research on and wrote about a number of the issues. 116 As noted
previously, the clinical students were the investigators for both the client and the LAWR III students, and one clinic student was assigned to
1 17
each of the LAWR workgroups.
advise him in this respect (he declined the offer); 5) determined that the client had no
objection to publication; and 6) asked the Committee, which includes faculty members who
are familiar with human experimentation guidelines, including the guidelines of the University of Maryland, to apply to this article the principles underlying those guidelines, and
to tell us whether it believes this article is consistent with them (it has done so, providing a
positive answer to our question).
115 Millemann has taught many clinical courses (including an appellate clinic) and practiced in the Clinic Law Program (as well as outside of it) for many years. He also has
taught a number of LRW courses in various forms, e.g., "legal method" and "LAWR"
courses. Schwinn has taught many LRW courses in many different forms, often integrating
his former full-time practice and recent pro bono work into those courses. He also teaches
a first-year Legal Theory and Practice course. See supra note 19.
116 There was some duplication of effort. Although this would have been a problem in a
private practice setting, it was not in an educational setting. Indeed, it often gave us an
additional check on the thoroughness of the students' research.
117 In retrospect, we should have reserved some places in the clinical course for students
who wanted and were qualified to be teaching assistants in the LAWR III course. Ideally,
these students would have been advanced (second-time) clinical students who previously
had been teaching assistants. This would have enabled us to tie the two courses more
closely together and to get some additional help in teaching the course.
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10. Inviting Student Evaluation of the Course
We devoted one class session to student evaluation of the course,
including the use of the Anthony case. 118 We have prepared a transcript of this discussion from which we quote liberally in Part III (A).
B.

Legal Analysis, Writing and Research II/Legal
Theory and Practice

Our second experimental course was LAWR II, which first year
students take in their second semester. The standard course description reads:
LAWR II continues the students' instruction in analysis, writing and
research by introducing students to a [civil] case at the trial level.
Working on a well developed case file, students learn to work with
facts, to develop a theory of the case, and to use their research and
writing skills to develop and advance that theory. Over the course
of the semester, students write several different documents to a
court, such as a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment,
or a trial brief.11 9
We added a three-credit "Legal Theory and Practice" ("LTP")
component12 0 to the two-credit LAWR II course, for a total of five
credits. We substituted actual cases for the "well developed case file"
in the standard LAWR II course, and expanded the course to include
12 1
an experiential component.
The usual focus of the LAWR II course is on the pretrial process
in civil cases and the research and writing related to it. By adding actual legal work to the course, particularly police brutality cases and a
civil right-to-counsel reform project, we added civil rights and accessto-justice issues to the course.
This LAWR II/LTP course was different from our LAWR III
course in important respects.
1.

The Students

We had fifteen students in the course, all of whom selected it as
their second-semester elective. 122 Although this was half the number
118 Millemann skipped this class. As the faculty member most identifiable as Anthony's
lawyer, we wanted to encourage students to give their frank and critical assessments of this
experimental component of the course.
119 This description came from the then-existing Course Catalog of University of Maryland School of Law (emphasis added).
120 See supra note 19.
121 The students also simultaneously took a separately taught one-credit research
course. See supra note 19.
122 All second-semester students are required to take LAWR If, but because we added
the three-credit LTP component to it, the course became an elective course. See supra note
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of students in our LAWR III course, the LAWR II course was for
more than twice the credits and we were supervising first-year
students.
2.

Selecting the Legal Work

We generated the actual legal work for the course from outside
the law school. Neither of us was counsel in the cases. Rather, the
clients were represented by outside lawyers. A small, private law firm
represented the plaintiffs in the police brutality cases, and a public
interest organization, the Public Justice Center, was representing one
client in the right-to-counsel case and preparing to represent additional clients. The private law firm and public interest organization, as
well as their clients and cases, were part of the teaching material in the
course.
We chose to teach with a small private law firm for several reasons. Many of our law school graduates eventually practice in small
private firms. These firms provide the bulk of legal services to individuals, including the "working poor" and people of modest means.
Many students would like to find ways to integrate public interest and
private practices, i.e., to make a living representing people and communities that need legal assistance. The firm we picked was a good
model of this integration.
Moreover, we wanted to debunk two common stereotypes. One
sharply contrasts public interest practice with for-profit private practice. It sends the message that public interest work should be governmentally-funded or reserved for saints, and that private practitioners
cannot substantially contribute to the public interest.
The second stereotype contrasts professionalism, which is good,
with commercialism, which is not. However, most lawyers are in the
private practice of law and have to make a living. If professionalism is
not consistent with responsible commercialism, professionalism can1 23
not exist at all.
By introducing first-year students to a private practice that represents the victims of police brutality, most of whom are poor and people of color, we hoped to give the students a basis to question the
private practice stereotypes, and to begin to explore ways in which,
20.
123 Indeed, challenges to professionalism often arise not just from over-commercialism,
but from incompetent commercialism-bad management that leads lawyers to handle client problems late or inefficiently and to communicate poorly, with the result that the lawyer has no time for the other functions of a good professional. See generally MICHAEL J.
KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE (1994). In

this book, Kelly demonstrates, through extended case studies of different forms of law
practice, the direct link between competent business management and professionalism.
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upon graduation, they can maintain their idealism in various forms of
private as well as public practices.
The Public Justice Center provided the students with a different
practice model. It was formed in 1985 to bring reform litigation
through teams of volunteer lawyers and staff counsel. When Congress
enacted draconian restrictions on federal funding for civil legal services, 124 this organization's independence (it does not seek or accept
Legal Services Corporation funds) became even more important.
Over the years, it has diversified its advocacy and become one of the
leading "unrestricted" law reform organizations in the region.
Together, the private law firm and public interest organization,
and their clients and projects, provided a rich context for teaching
LRW skills and analyzing access-to-justice, delivery of legal services,
professional responsibility, and other related issues.
3.

Organizing, Teaching, and Supervising the Law Students

We worked closely with two lawyers from the private law firm
12 5
and several from the public interest organization.
The private lawyers provided case files to us, taught a class on
litigating police brutality cases, and answered questions that the students had during the course of the semester. They obtained client approval for the students' work, and helped us to devise the assignments.

The assignments in the right-to-counsel project challenged the
students to address procedural and substantive issues Maryland's
courts have not resolved. 126 The students' work supported the organi124 Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104134, § 504, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001)
(holding part of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 to
be unconstitutional). For a more in depth analysis of these funding restrictions and the
potential ethical issues they raise, see Alan W. Houseman, Restrictions by Funders and the
Ethical Practice of Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2187 (1999).
125 The Public Justice Center's volunteer lawyer was Stephen H. Sachs, a former United
States Attorney and State Attorney General, who taught a class on the test case, Frase v.
Barnhart, 840 A.2d 114 (Md. 2003), which spawned the class project, and which he had
argued in the Maryland Court of Appeals. We also worked closely with Debra Gardner,
Legal Director of the Public Justice Center.
126 In Frase, the Public Justice Center argued that indigent parents faced with loss of
custody of children have a state constitutional right to court-appointed counsel. Id. at 12630. They traced this right, in part, to the law of England, including a 1494 statute that
authorized courts to appoint counsel to represent indigent litigants. Id. at 126. This law,
they argued, has been made part of Maryland's law through a state constitutional "incorporation" provision that most of the early states have in their constitutions. Id. at 126-67.
They incorporate those provisions of English law effective in 1776 that the state has not
repealed or effectively nullified. Id. See also Michael Millemann, Mandatory Pro Bono in
Civil Cases: A Partial Answer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REv. 18, 32-48 (1990)
(describing incorporation into Maryland law of English statute providing for appointment
of counsel in civil cases). The public interest lawyers also based Frase's claim on two provi-
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zation's continuing representation of its right-to-counsel client, Frase,
and possible future litigation on behalf of a new client or clients.
We designed the course around these two sets of cases. 127 We divided the students into groups of two to three to work on the police
cases, and met with each group weekly. By the end of the semester,
the students had conducted client and witness interviews and drafted
basic pleadings, including a complaint, interrogatories, and requests

for documents. 128 We reviewed all of the written work, as well as the
development and implementation of case plans. Students did several

129
drafts of most written work.
Each student wrote his or her own memorandum on the right-to-

counsel issues, although we worked collaboratively with the students,

and they with one another, to develop possible legal theories. As in
the Anthony case, the assignments in the right-to-counsel project were
relatively open-ended. The students were presented a real problem
that had no clear answer and no direct precedent.
4. Insuring Client Confidentiality

Although we were not counsel in these matters, we were working
under the direction of and with counsel in the cases, and thus our
work was included within the scope of their work-product privileges
and their clients' client-attorney privileges. 130 Because the LAWR II
students also were LTP students, they had offices in our clinical space.
Like the LAWR III students, these students also "posted" their work
sions of Maryland's Declaration of Rights. Frase, 840 A.2d at 127. The Maryland Court of
Appeals, in a 4-3 decision, failed to reach the merits of the argument. Id. at 126. Three
judges (including the Chief Judge) concurred in the result and dissented from the failure of
the majority to decide the right-to-counsel question. They would have reached the issue
and resolved it in favor of the right to counsel. Id. at 131-39 (Cathell, J., Bell, C.J., &
Eldridge, J., concurring).
127 We taught classes on LRW skills, fact investigation (including interviewing), pleadings (the students were drafting complaints, discovery requests, and motions in their police
brutality cases), sovereign immunity (a common defense in the police cases), research and
writing, the procedural and substantive issues related to the civil right-to-counsel case and,
professional responsibility and access-to-justice issues, among other topics.
128 In preparation for the interviews, we taught a segment on interviewing that included
mock interviews. We scheduled the initial interviews in the law school and one of us was
present for them. After that, students interviewed witnesses and clients in their neighborhoods, but in teams (at least two students). Because these were first-year students, we held
the supervisory reins a little tighter than usual. (For example, we observed more interviews, and participated more actively in them, than we would have done in a clinical course
with upper level students.)The students, however, performed as well as second- and thirdyear students, which has been our experience in other LTP courses. See supra note 19.
129 The cumulative student product in each of the police cases was a "case file" that
included all of the student's work on the case during the semester. Before we turned the
files over to the law firm, we did our own "quality control" reviews of them.
130 See infra Part III(B)(2).
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on a secure computer system, and discussed it outside the classroom
1 31
only in private settings and only with other students in the course.

III.

OUR ASSESSMENT OF USING ACTUAL LEGAL WORK TO
TEACH LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING COURSES

Based on our two LAWR course experiments, we believe there
are many good reasons to teach LRW courses with actual legal work.
We begin with the benefits, and then consider the challenges. In intro-

duction, we note that these were two of the most interesting and successful courses that we have taught in over forty years combined of
132
law school teaching.

A.
1.

Benefits of Teaching LRW Courses with Actual Legal Work

Teaching Core Skills

Actual legal work can enrich the teaching of basic skills- legal
research, analysis, synthesis, and writing-in at least two ways. First, it
can motivate students to learn, and thus enhance learning generally.
Second, it can help students to explore in depth some dimensions of

these skills that students normally do not encounter in canned
problems.
a.

Enhanced Motivation From Actual Legal Work

Working on real cases may motivate students for a combination
of reasons. It may be the sense of responsibility for another person

and the self-fulfillment that comes from helping another; the teacher's
confidence, and the student's reciprocal discovery, that she can handle

the responsibility; the sense of injustice in some cases; or simply that
the real case is interesting and challenging. 133

131 As with the LAWR III course, we devoted one class to student evaluation of the
course, including the use of actual legal work to teach it. We have prepared a transcript of
this discussion from which we quote liberally in Part III(A).
132 In both courses, the student evaluations were excellent. They were stronger than our
evaluations in LAWR courses that we had taught without using actual legal work and comparable to our best evaluations in non-LRW courses. We note that evaluations in LRW
courses tend to be lower than in other courses. Melissa Marlow-Shafer, Student Evaluation
of Teacher Performance and the "Legal Writing Pathology": Diagnosis Confirmed, 5 N.Y.
CrTY L. REV. 115, 127 (2002) (describing survey data that indicate students generally give
lower evaluations to LRW courses and teachers than to other courses and teachers).
133 Peter Hoffman describes many of the sources of real-case motivation: "The assumption of responsibility for another's welfare, the novelty of the situation, the scrutiny of the
teacher, clients, judges, and lawyers, and the perception that the student's success in the
clinic directly reflects on future professional success all contribute to what [Gary] Bellow
labeled a 'need to know.' This intense need results in a high degree of effort by the students which, in turn, may translate into a correspondingly high level of learning." Hoffman,
supra note 63, at 287. See also George S. Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: History and
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In the two courses we taught, the students identified most of
these as sources of motivation. One LAWR III student said: "I think
it's much more rewarding having a real client," referring to Anthony.
He added: "I find myself compelled by his situation, and I have responded, I think, significantly more to the work and the research and
everything that's involved with this class than I would with a canned
case." By comparison, in this student's view, the canned problems in
prior LAWR courses were "exercises quite frankly in tedium and
boredom" in which it was "just a matter of doing it by rote" and get'134
ting it "done [so] you can move on."
Another LAWR III student said: "I felt personally challenged to
do the very best that I could here and I like that." He emphasized:
"It's real. We know that this guy is actually sitting in prison and we're
doing research ... to help him get out. [He] got hosed 35 years ago
and he shouldn't be sitting there." Referring, by comparison, to the
parties in a canned problem in a prior LAWR course, the student said:
"Mary Jo and Wally are fictional, and I really couldn't care less about
their issue or whether Mary Jo wins her case against Wally and he
can't use her tapes. I mean, it's an interesting argument ... [b]ut, this
is for real .... [I]t's something that we can see ourselves doing years
'135
down the line in real practice.
A third LAWR III student added: The fact this was a real case
was "part of the incentive to do more work whatever the nature of the
' 136
research was."
Indeed, the impact of the Anthony case, combined with the addition of the weekly workgroup meetings, produced the valid criticism
that the students were working substantially in excess of the twocredit allocation for the LAWR III course. One student's comment
was representative: "[T]his has been a great class. I just think that
comparatively it certainly should be a three-credit class, because I
think people are worthy of our help. I think we get a lot from it. I
' 137
think we're doing a good thing.
Diagnosis,26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 162 (1974). Grossman says: "The value of using live cases is
seen to lie in the increase in interest and motivation which it provides for students and in
the increase in student social awareness which should result from exposure, perhaps for the
first time in some students' lives, to social problems .... [Actual cases] can also help
greatly in allowing students insights into their own personalities and motivations and into
the art of human relations." Id. at 185 (footnotes omitted). He adds: "It may simply be
impossible to recreate in a simulated setting the emotional and ethical elements of law
practice." Id.
134 LAWR III student comments made as part of course evaluation.
135 LAWR III student comments made as part of course evaluation.
136 LAWR III student comments made as part of course evaluation.
137 LAWR III student comments made as part of course evaluation. See infra Part
Il(B) for our reaction to this criticism.
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The LAWR II students also reacted positively to their work on
the police brutality cases and civil right-to-counsel project. One noted
that the course helped the students to understand what lawyers experience "when they are involved in a case." "[I was] living, and breath'138
ing and sleeping" the case work.
Another LAWR II student said: "[T]his class helped me to ...
refocus and reevaluate reasons why I decided to come here." He predicted that he "probably will wind up in public interest .... [T]hat's
what pushes me in this class and helps me to remember that ... this is
hard and this is a lot of work and I just want to go to sleep at night,
but you know, it keeps you focused, at least for me, on a different
139
level."
The students' positive reactions are particularly interesting given
that the students did not have attorney-client relationships with the
clients and that we did not do a particularly good job in teaching with
the clients and their stories, e.g., by bringing them into the classroom
(when we could have), either in person or by videotape, or by having
them address the students in writings or through audiotapes. We examine the students' responses in the context of the three sets of relationships the LAWR students had with the people whom they were
helping.
i. Anthony: LAWR III
The LAWR III students did not represent Anthony, and did not
meet him during the semester. 140 Still, Anthony had a virtual presence
in the LRW classes and workgroup meetings. Millemann regularly
provided the students with information about Anthony, and a profile
of him emerged from the record. The students' sense of responsibility
for Anthony, and their reactions to the injustice in his case, animated
141
their work during the course.
ii. The Clients in the Police Brutality Cases: LAWR II
The private law firm represented these plaintiffs, but the LAWR
II students met with and interviewed the clients. These personal interactions strongly motivated the students, and encouraged some to challenge common stereotypes about people whom police arrest. Many of
138 LAWR II student comments made as part of course evaluation.
139 LAWR II student comments made as part of course evaluation.
140 The Clinical Law Program, operating through Millemann, two other clinical teachers,
and three clinic students, represented Anthony.
141 After the LAWR III course, two of the LAWR III students enrolled in the postconviction clinic to continue to work on Anthony's case, and several other LAWR III students volunteered to work on his case without enrolling in the clinic. Most of the other
LAWR III students expressed continuing interest in Anthony's case after the course ended.
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the students came to think of these plaintiffs as their clients. A
LAWR II student said: "[O]ne thing that I really enjoyed about the
class was the chance to help [people]." From this, the student got "a
sense of the kind of legal problems that people have [and] the reasons
why." During the course, the student saw "the change in my views and
the views of my classmates about why certain people have certain
problems and how these things come about .... ",142
Another LAWR II student said: "I'm never going to forget the
name of my first client and I think that's something that you don't
realize until after it happens. But, I'm so aware of what I've been
doing and the impact this person has had on me.... " Speaking of this
relationship, the student said: "that's something that is going to stay
'143
forever with me. It's really special.
iii. The Client and Potential Clients in the Civil Right-to-Counsel
Project: LAWR II
Ms. Frase, an indigent mother, had represented herself at the custody hearing. 144 With the representation of the public interest organization, she prevailed on appeal but without a decision on the civil
right-to-counsel claim. 14 5 The organization anticipates making a similar claim in a future case. The organization's volunteer counsel in the
case introduced and personalized the existing client in his presentation
to the class, explaining why he felt compelled to represent her, and
she became an effective representative of potential future clients as
well.
b.

The Impact of Enhanced Motivation on Education:
Core Skills

The students' enhanced motivation was manifested in several
ways.
Almost all of the students participated in the classroom discussions and all participated in the workgroup meetings. The quality of
the discussions was very high in both settings. In a process that clinical
teachers witness regularly, the discussions spilled over into informal
(but confidential) conversations in person, on the phone, and through
emails. This is one of the best and most exciting forms of professional
engagement. It produces high quality representation and strong collegial relationships. It can be exhilarating, challenging, draining, and
fun, and it was all of these things in our two courses.
142 LAWR II student comments made as part of course evaluation.
143 LAWR II student comments made as part of course evaluation.
144 See supra notes 125-26.
145 Id.
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There also was an absence of student cynicism in the two LAWR
courses. This stands in sharp contrast to courses taught with canned
problems, which regularly produce a fair number of cynical comments.
In comparison to students' average work product in our more
traditional LRW courses, the students' average work product in these
two experimental courses was stronger in most, but not all, respects.
The students' legal research was better, both more on point and
more comprehensive. It was not only the motivation from the actual
legal work, but also a common student understanding about canned
problems that helps to explain this. One LAWR III student described
the difference in this way:
[W]hen you have a real.., case you don't have the guarantee that
there are some cases on each side. It's not like you're going to just
[take] the requisite amount of time and find the golden ring, because it might not, in fact, be there. And, even if you find it you still
have to keep looking because there might be more things. And, I
understand though, that certainly plays out in a regular [LRW] class
but I don't think it plays out anywhere near to the extent that it did
in this class. [There were] some of the foundation cases [that] were
world and
easy. But once you got past those, it was a wide-open
1 46
that was, I thought, a little bit more challenging.
Another LAWR III student said: "it's my understanding of the
canned cases that they are built around certain court cases, and there's
ten cases on the one side and ten on the other, and once ... you've
found those ten everything's good. Whereas, [in this course], you
didn't know what was out there. You could push a little bit further
beyond the cases." The student added that "[you did a] legislative history" when necessary and "[you did] all the research that you could
147
possibly do versus just ... finding those ten cases, and you're done."
In addition, the students' legal analysis generally was deeper in
the two experimental courses. For example, the theories of the case
and resulting arguments were better developed, more persuasive and
more nuanced. The students also found and developed new arguments
(ones that we had not previously identified), and added new components to and refined the predicted arguments, in ways that students in
our traditional courses generally had not done.
We attribute the enhanced student creativity to the fact that we
had not retrospectively created the argument pathways in the assignments as we would have with a canned problem, and thereby prede146 LAWR III student comments made as part of course evaluation. See related discussion supra Part I(C)(2) and (3).
147 LAWR III student comments made as part of course evaluation.
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termined the students' "answers.' 48 Rather, the students developed
many of these "answers"-in the forms of theories, arguments, authorities, and facts-through a dialectical process as we went through
the semesters.
In the experimental courses, the students' factual statements, and
their use of the facts in their legal arguments, also were substantially
better than in our traditional courses. The quality of advocacy also
was generally better.
For these reasons, the final briefs and oral arguments were better
than in our more traditional LRW courses.
On the other hand, to the extent that we can separate quality of
writing from strength of analysis, the quality of writing, e.g., grammar,
syntax, and style, were not better.
c.

Learning Different Dimensions of Core LRW Skills

The two LAWR courses introduced students to some dimensions
of skills that students do not normally learn from canned problems.
i. Constructing Factual Accounts
One set of skills relates to facts. We use the LAWR III course as
an example because it is most similar in structure to standard LRW
courses.
The primary information in the Anthony case came from documents. Obtaining the basic story in a case from documents requires a
disciplined form of investigation. One must piece together meaning
from often ambiguous words, the chronology of events, the characteristics, relationships, motives, and histories of the actors, and seemingly
incidental marks and notations, as well as other parts of the overall
context. It is an exercise in detection, translation and interpretation.
In Anthony's case, students had to be discriminating readers. All
of the documents were not relevant to any one student's single issue.
Conversely, there were informational gaps in the records. The students had to identify what they knew, what they needed to know, and
14 9
how they could obtain what they needed.
Through this process, the students learned they could exercise
some control over the issues and arguments.
Learning to organize facts, including those obtained from docu148 See related discussion supra Part I(C)(2) and (3).
149 They could do this by re-reading the documents to see if they had missed something,
by determining whether a different interpretation of existing information was feasible, by
asking the post-conviction students for information (see supra Part II(A)(2)(b)), and by
proposing "stipulations" (adding limited hypothetical features to the actual case). See
supra Part II(A)(6).
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ments, required the students to develop another set of skills. The students used practice-based structures for doing this, including
chronologies, "elements" and "theory-of-the case" analysis, and storytelling.
Finally, the students had to construct their factual accounts in
ways that would appeal to a real, not hypothetical, decision-maker. In

150
talking about the "transcendent importance of the facts of cases,"

Jerome Frank observed that the "actual facts ... do not walk into the

courtroom."' 15 1 They are produced by "the fallible subjective reactions of the trial judge or jury to the fallible reactions of the witness.

' 152

Using a real-world problem required our students to write

with real decision-makers in mind.
In sum, working with a real case helped our students to begin to
develop fact-based skills in ways that canned problems containing
stipulated facts could not have. 153 This method of teaching also responds to criticisms of appellate advocacy courses that we believe
54
have merit.'
150 Frank, supra note 39, at 1306.
151 Id.

152 Id. at 1307. Frank stressed that "legal rules are never self-operative," but rather they
"are always at the mercy of those [fallible factual] findings, and often of that subjectivity."
Id. Part of that "subjectivity," according to Frank, is created by the "preconceptions,"
"habits" of mind ("pre-judgments"), individual "interests", unique "points of view", and
personal "preferences" that judges, like all other human beings, have. Id. at 1308-09.
153 This is particularly important given how rare it is in a classroom course that a student
is "required to do his own inquiry, to structure his own investigation, to sort and select the
initial set of factual descriptions with which legal analysis begins." Gary Bellow & Earl
Johnson, Reflections on the University of Southern California Clinical Semester, 44 S. CAL.
L. REv. 664, 691 (1971). The classroom experience "seems to diminish the student's interest in factual inquiry itself and to create an extremely static perception of the world." Id.
For the importance of teaching about facts, see, for example, Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Clinical Legal Education - A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612, 614-15
(1984).
154 In 1985, the Appellate Judges' Conference of the ABA criticized law schools for
their failure to adequately teach appellate advocacy, in large part because the mock cases
lack real factual records. Appellate Litigation Skills Training: The Role of the Law
Schools-Reportand Recommendations of the Committee on Appellate Skills Training,Appellate Judges' Conference, Judicial Administration Division, Am. Bar Ass'n, 54 U. CIN. L.
REV. 129 (1985). Two of the three Conference criticisms dealt with the absence of real
factual records. The Conference said: "[B]ecause [law school appellate advocacy courses]
lack a realistic appeal record they do not aid in the development of the skill that is unique
to appellate litigation: building a case out of a record .... [A]s a result...

,

the issues

argued in these programs are usually abstract legal questions without factual content upon
which most appeals are decided." Id. at 142. The Conference said: "The use of feigned
cases for moot court instead of actual records makes a bad matter worse." Id. at 129. It
recommended that appellate advocacy and moot court programs be restructured. "Central
to this restructuring is the use of an appeal record from a real case. Hypothetical cases
based on feigned records should not be used." Id. at 154.
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Dealing with Indeterminate Legal Issues

The Anthony case in LAWR III and the civil right-to-counsel
project in LAWR II presented a variety of indeterminate and contingent legal issues. Our students had to determine the relationships
among issues and to construct legal arguments by proposing and justifying legal rules or components of them. This was both difficult and
creative. It also is an essential part of a student's education.
Professors Jay Feinman and Marc Feldman argue that
"[i]ndeterminacy and contingency are the essence of our theory of
law. For practicing lawyers, and for students who would become prac55
titioners, the message is one of freedom and its limits.'
[I]magine a continuum of certainty on which we locate all legal
events-jury verdicts, judicial decisions, planned transactions, legal
advice, and so forth. At one end of the continuum lie those events
the outcome of which is highly predictable (though never certain).
For these events, the controlling doctrine is well established, systematic or structural bias is pronounced, and social convention is clear.
As we move away from that pole of the continuum, the indeterminacy of doctrine and the contingency of experience become more
156
pronounced.
They contend that "[t]he function of legal education is to enable
students to situate themselves on the continuum and to take advantage of the opportunities presented by indeterminacy and contingency."'1 57 To do so, will call upon "the intelligence, the energy, the
preparation, the skill, [and] the imagination" of a good lawyer.' 5 8
One of our LAWR II students observed: It was a "struggle" to
"sit[ ] down in front of a computer, in front of Lexis and WestLaw,
155 Jay Feinman & Marc Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L.J. 875, 888-89
(1985). See also Evan Caminker, A Glimpse Behind and Beyond Grutter, 48 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 889, 889 (2004) ("In fact, as litigators well know, precedential cases are created; they
are not handed down or found somewhere.").
156 Feinman & Feldman, supra note 155, at 889.
157 Id.
158 Id. Maureen E. Laflin argues that appellate advocacy clinics challenge students to
deal with open-ended issues. Maureen E. Laflin, Toward the Making of Good Lawyers:
How an Appellate Clinic Satisfies the Professional Objectives of the MacCrate Report, 33
GONZ. L. REV. 1 (1997). She says that unlike simulation courses, "[1]ive client appellate
clinics ...typically provide cases with ill-defined substantive boundaries and chaotic procedural backgrounds. No author of a simulated problem can develop a scenario that matches
the factual and procedural detail present in a real case." Id. at 23.
[Such a clinic] also gives many students their first encounter with legal issues for
which there are no clear answers. The lack of answers can be frustrating. Sometimes
appellate students find it to be nearly debilitating if there are no cases directly on
point. Yet seldom are real-life appellate cases so easily resolved. Appellate students
must be good artisans. They must combine the facts in their case with relevant case
law, molding them together into their own story, their theory of the case.
Id. at 28 (footnotes omitted).
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and ... try[ ] to come up with an answer that didn't exist. And there's
so much out there." "[We had] this big problem", and "[we had] to
make this choice about what we thought was the right answer and
159
then go[] out and find[ ] cases that would back up our ideas."
Another said: "[I]t's ... nice to think on our own again." It was
important that there was "no right answer", and that students were
invited to come up with different answers. This student compared this
course to the first research and writing course in which, in this student's view, the students were trying to find the single, right answer
160
that the teacher had pre-selected.
A LAWR III student, who defended canned problems, said: "I
think [this course] is ... the next logical step in progression in legal
writing and research and in terms of our own education.... [I]t's easy
to ... bash the canned [case], but for LAWR II, the canned [case] is
essential. In LAWR I we're given everything. Spoon fed cases and
the universe is closed. LAWR II begins with the closed universe, and
expands [it].... [N]ow [in LAWR III], you're completely opening up
the universe."' 16 1 This student envisions a LRW course taught with actual legal work as the final, open-ended step in teaching legal research, analysis, and writing.
2.

Achieving Other Teaching Goals
a. Introducing Students to Client-CenteredProblem-Solving

The fact there were actual clients in both LAWR courses motivated the students to seek solutions for their problems, even if it
meant revising the assigned issues and seeking to develop new facts.
As a result, the classes often evolved into problem-solving exercises,
but without changing the basic nature of the research and writing assignments. These were client-driven discussions. One LAWR III student described the process this way: "[You] research [an argument]
and kind of hit a dead end . . . , and move[ ] on to something that's
'162
maybe more of a winner to try and find a way to get this guy out.
The real-world complexities of actual clients present some options,
and foreclose others in ways that cannot credibly be embodied in
163
canned problems.
159 LAWR II student comments made as part of course evaluation.
160 LAWR II student comments made as part of course evaluation.
161 LAWR III student comments made as part of course evaluation.
162 LAWR III student comments made as part of course evaluation.
163 In Anthony's case, for example, we made case decisions-ultimately to seek clemency, rather than to file pleadings-that probably would not have been on the table with a
canned problem. The post-conviction clinic students took the lead in the clemency effort,
but we used much of the LAWR III student work in the clemency papers. Litigation still
remains an option, however, to clear Mr. Anthony's name and to seek to terminate release
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Two other features of the courses supported this problem solving
approach. The issue assignments were flexible and the course structure was collaborative. In both LAWR courses, the students worked in
teams. In LAWR III, they met in larger workgroups (comprised of
64
several teams of co-counsel, including opposing teams) as well.'
These are common organizational structures for clinical courses.
We believe that LRW courses are logical places to teach problemsolving. 165 However, the assignments must be flexible enough to allow
students discretion to identify alternative ways to approach a problem
and to make decisions based on that discretion. It is illogical to assume
"that the dynamics of problem-solving and decision-making can be adequately taught without ever asking the student to engage in the process himself."'1 66 If we ask students to engage in the process, we must
be prepared to respect their decisions if they are reasonable, even if
this requires us to make mid-course adjustments in the assignments.
b.

Teaching About Professional Responsibility Issues,
Especially Those Related to Access to Justice and Pro Bono

Some argue that by carefully selecting writing assignments, LRW
teachers can help make students more "sensitive to the perspectives
of people who are not like themselves;"' 167 begin a process of "real
social reform;' 1 68 help students "associate an awareness of ethics with
use of [LRW] skills;' 1 69 and help students appreciate "their responsibility to perform pro bono legal work throughout their careers."' 170 A
number of commentators have emphasized the importance of dealing
with professional responsibility issues in LRW courses. 171
conditions that limit Mr. Anthony's freedom today.
164 See Parts HI(A), (B) supra.
165 See Matthew C. Cordon, Beyond Mere Competency: Advanced Legal Research in a
Practice-OrientedCurriculum, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 5 (2003). Professor Cordon notes the
parallel between problem-solving and legal research:
The description of the process of researching legal issues parallels the treatment of
problem solving ... as a process consisting of: diagnosis of the problem; identification of the range of possible solutions; development of a plan of action; and implementation of the plan. This parallelism is appropriate because legal research is in
essence a process of problem solving.
Id. (quoting the MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 29, at 163). See also Myron Moskovitz,
Beyond the Case Method: It's Time to Teach with Problems, 42 J. LEGAL EDuc. 241, 249-51
(1992); Seligmann, supra note 33, at 189.
166 Bellow & Johnson, supra note 153, at 690-91.
167 Susan P. Liemer, Many Birds, One Stone: Teaching the Law You Love, in Legal Writing Class, 53 J. LEGAL EDuc. 284, 286 (2003).
168 Id.
169 Id. at 287.
170 Id.
171 See, e.g., Brook K. Baker, Traditional Issues of Professional Responsibility and a
Transformative Ethic of Client Empowerment for Legal Discourse, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV.
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We believe, however, that to teach professional responsibility effectively, and to accomplish most of the other laudable teaching objectives, the LRW assignments should be based on actual legal work.
Many have identified ways in which clinical courses teach legal ethics,
professional responsibility, and moral judgment. 17 2 We think these ar-

guments apply, albeit in more limited ways, to LRW courses in which
students have some responsibility for a client's matter, whether or not
the students are representing the client themselves. The problems of
actual clients generate professional responsibility issues and exper-

iences that cannot be credibly mimicked in a hypothetical. Our students had to act responsibly, as well as to consider how they should
act, in a variety of situations that raised professional responsibility

issues.
In our two courses, we focused on access-to-justice and pro bono
issues. 173 As Ann Shalleck points out, these issues arise naturally in
teaching with real clients who are members of generally unrepresented groups:
First, students in the educational program can analyze who has ac809, 810 (2000) (arguing that legal writing classes should be used for teaching "traditional"
values of professional responsibility, as well as to address "more transformative issues" of
professional responsibility-such as client empowerment and social justice); Margaret Z.
Johns, Teaching ProfessionalResponsibility and Professionalism in Legal Writing, 40 J. LEGAL Enuc. 501, 507-08 (1990); Maurer & Mischler, supra note 38, at 101-02; Michael E.
Wolfson, Professional Responsibility as a Lawyering Skill, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
297, 299-301 (1995) (describing a course that was designed to combine lawyering skills and
professional responsibility issues). Cf. James E. Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential
Education, and Professional Responsibility, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 71, 100-06 (1996)
(tracing history of experiential legal education and noting how it can be used to teach
professional responsibility).
172 See, e.g., Steven Hartwell, Moral Growth or Moral Angst?: A Clinical Approach, 11
CLIN. L. REV. 115, 140-41 (2004); Peter A. Joy, The MacCrate Report: Moving Toward
Integrated Learning Experiences, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 401, 406 (1994); Laflin, supra note 158, at
48-50; David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark
Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 31, 58-64 (1995); Joan L. O'Sullivan, Susan P. Leviton,
Deborah J. Weimer, Stanley S. Herr, Douglas L. Colbert, Jerome E. Deise, Andrew P.
Reese & Michael A. Millemann, Ethical Decisionmakingand Ethics Instruction in Clinical
Law Practice, 3 CLIN. L. REV. 109, 110 (1996); Amy D. Ronner, Some In-House Appellate
Litigation Clinic's Lessons in ProfessionalResponsibility: Musical Stories of Candor and the
Sandbag, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 859, 874-81 (1996); Philip G. Schrag, Constructinga Clinic, 3
CLIN. L. REV. 175, 184-85 (1996); Robert A. Solomon, Teaching Morality, 40 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 507, 508-10 (1992).
173 In 1948, Erwin N. Griswold, Dean of Harvard Law School, criticized legal education
for its failure to introduce students to "the opportunity and responsibility of the lawyer for
service to the public." Erwin N. Griswold, Report of the National Law Student Conference
on Legal Education: Foreword,1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 64, 67 (1948). He focused on the need to
provide the majority of people with more effective access to our justice systems. "For the
most part legal service is a luxury, available in any real sense to only a small portion of the
public." Id. That observation describes today's legal services delivery system as well. See
supra note 3.
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cess to the legal world, under what conditions, and why access is
distributed in particular ways. Second, they can discuss the effects
on legal institutions and legal concepts when groups of people have
limited or no access to legal resources.... Third, students can investigate the meaning that the denial of access to the legal system can
have in the clients' worlds .... Fourth, the students can explore what

it means to be a lawyer for people who would otherwise be denied
174
access to the legal system.

The access issues were pervasive in our two courses.
Mr. Anthony had been convicted and sentenced to life because
his lawyer had provided constitutionally ineffective assistance to him
at trial and on appeal. In LAWR III, his case provided a basis to critique the legal services delivery system in criminal cases, from trial
through the post-conviction process.
The ability of the plaintiffs in the police brutality cases to obtain
counsel depended not so much on the egregiousness of the police conduct, but rather on whether the case was likely to generate a contingent fee, i.e., whether the plaintiffs could prove their claims and had
sustained substantial injuries.
The civil right-to-counsel project revealed the large numbers of
people who lose important rights, including custody of their children,
without legal representation.
Speaking of the access-to-justice issue, one LAWR II student
said: "I could have gone through school for three years and never ever
touched it, and I could just practice my whole life and never even have
to approach the subject. [The course] forced us to think about
it .... "175
176
Both courses presented pro bono issues in theory and practice.
In LAWR II, one of the chief lawyers in the civil right-to-counsel project was a distinguished lawyer working on a pro bono basis. In
LAWR III, the students and we were engaged in academic versions of
pro bono representation. The LAWR III students were working sub-

174 Shalleck, supra note 7, at 1740-41. Shalleck criticizes the absence of real clients in
most of legal education. She shows how professors ignore or dehumanize clients in the
standard classroom recitations of the facts of cases and construction of legal arguments. Id.
at 1733-37. Where clients exist, they are "cardboard clients." Id. at 1732. This excludes "the
very people whose lives and work, whose problems and desires, bring them into contact
with the legal system." Id. She argues that "the classroom treatment of legal ethics replicates and reinforces the construction of the client carried out in the rest of legal education." Id.
175 LAWR II student comments made as part of course evaluation.
176 As Rebecca Cochran persuasively argues, by engaging LRW students in actual legal
work, professors and students can help to provide substantial pro bono assistance to people
and can use these experiences to analyze pro bono issues. Cochran, supra note 66, at 44647.
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stantially in excess of the two credits allocated to the course, 177 and
both of us were teaching this course on a "pro bono" basis. We decided to teach the course after we had negotiated our teaching loads,
and we voluntarily taught it as an addition to our normal load. This
gave us parity and credibility with the students.
We cannot demonstrate empirically that as a result of our
courses, the students will do more pro bono work as lawyers than they
otherwise would have done, but the courses have features that make it
more likely students will take the pro bono ideal seriously. Based on a
major study of pro bono programs in law schools and practice,
Deborah Rhode concludes that "well-designed strategies by law
schools," as well as by the bar and law firms, "can increase the quality
and attractiveness of pro bono service. ' 17 8 She adds: "Providing direct
exposure to the human costs of social problems can also prove
'179
important.
The survey identified problems with the predominant pro bono
model in law schools today. The programs are not integrated into the
curriculum, which means they are not supervised or taught by law
professors. Therefore, they do not appear to students to be part of the
mainstream culture. 180 "One of the most common complaints was that
the majority of faculty did not promote or 'appreciate' pro bono work.
Nor did they emphasize lawyers' ethical responsibility to pursue it."181
Teaching LRW courses, especially in the first year, with actual
legal work addresses these problems. It integrates pro bono work into
courses that have become part of the core curriculum. Faculty and
students work together, and with outside pro bono lawyers, to help
underrepresented people. Through the mainstream culture of the
177 This was so for several reasons. The record in the case was substantial. The students
not only attended weekly classes, they also worked in pairs and met once a week in the
issue work groups. There were ad hoc meetings between students and us, as there are in
clinical courses. Most of the students did some factual research to supplement the record.
Although the post-conviction clinic students were primarily responsible for this, the
LAWR III students sometimes had to, or more often wanted to, do factual research as well.
Students in clinics often make the same sorts of pro bono contributions to their clients and
courses. One difference, however, is that we graded our LAWR III students pursuant to a
grade protocol for LAWR courses, which produces a substantially lower grade average
than do the comparable understandings for clinic grades. Thus, our LAWR III students did
not receive some of the "compensation" for their extra work that clinic students receive.
178 Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 413,

423 (2003).
179 Id.

180 Perhaps because of this, "only a fifth (twenty-two percent) [of the lawyers surveyed]
indicated that positive law school experiences had encouraged involvement in pro bono
activities." Id. at 455. "A supportive culture was conveyed through a graduation requirement or the attitudes of faculty and students." Id.
181

Id.
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school, students are given "direct exposure to the human costs of social problems"18 2 and responsibility for responding to them.
Rhode makes comparable recommendations, including "curricular integration of materials concerning access to justice and pro bono
service in professional responsibility courses, orientation programs,
and core courses," and "pro bono contributions by faculty at levels
1 83
comparable to those expected of students."'

c.

Providing a Basis for CriticalAnalysis of Law and Justice
Systems

One way to evaluate law and justice systems is to see how they
operate in fact on real people and legal problems. This "critiquing"
function is an important part of clinical courses. We believe it belongs
in LRW courses as well.
In LAWR III, Anthony's case was a window to the criminal justice system, through which we could view problems of the past and
present, and use that knowledge to think about and initiate steps to

improve today's system. 184
In LAWR II, the police brutality cases provided insights into the

first stages of the criminal justice system (the police force occurred
prior to or during arrests), the relationships between police and suspected offenders, and larger law-related issues of race, class, and

culture.
We do not suggest that LRW teachers should overload a twocredit course with analysis of all of the related issues that actual legal
Id. at 423.
Id. at 461. Rebecca Cochran agrees in substantial part. She points out that "most pro
bono requirements implicitly teach students that pro bono work is to be performed not as
part of the law school curriculum taught by law school faculty, but primarily outside the
law school with supervising practitioners." Cochran, supra note 66, at 431. She "proposes
using legal research and writing programs as a well-supervised and cost-effective means of
engaging students in pro bono legal work during law school." Id. She offers several arguments in support of this proposal:
First, it reaches students in their first year, when student interest in pro bono service
is greatest and when students are determining why they are in law school and what it
means to be a lawyer. Second, it potentially involves larger numbers of students than
existing models. Third, it provides close faculty supervision of pro bono work by
utilizing LRW faculty members within the law school who already develop research
and writing skills through client simulations. Finally, the proposal supports local pro
bono providers in need of help.
Id.
184 The case posed questions about the adversarial process and the roles of lawyers and
courts in it; the reasonable doubt standard, and the state's burden of proving guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt; the justifications for the state and federal post-conviction processes;
the balance between finality and individual fairness in criminal cases; the availability of
parole and executive clemency in criminal cases; and more broadly, the impact of race,
class, and poverty on the administration of criminal justice, among many other issues.
182
183
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work generates. Rather, the teacher should select a limited number of
social justice issues; ideally, organized around a single theme. They
should be those that present the best teaching moments, which some
have characterized as "disorienting moments.

' 18 5

David Luban de-

scribes the use of experience to challenge legal dogma as "a kind of
Copernican disorientation," comparing experience-based legal epiphanies to the discovery that our world is neither flat nor the center of
the universe.18 6 In classes like these, the realization that the dogma is
false-the disorienting moment-is not the end, but rather the first
step the student takes in constructing his or her own understanding of
the matter. Our goals were to mediate this process and to help stu-

dents identify an array of options to choose from.
3.

Changing the Culture of the First Year of Legal Education

Many students come to law school with the goal of helping people. Others whose goals are not as well-formed seek careers that will
have meaning beyond material success. Helping students like these

understand that they can use their developing professional skills to
serve others validates their best instincts and is a first step in shaping
their professional self-concepts. The sooner this comes in a law student's education, the better. The more it is delayed, the more alien187
ated and disengaged some law students will become.
185 Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and The
Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLIN. L. REv. 37, 52 (1995). See id. at 38
(arguing that "lessons of social justice should be a core element of the law school curriculum in general and the content of clinical courses in particular," and that teachers should
consciously seek to use a student reaction to injustice-the "disorienting moment"-as a
basis for this teaching). See also Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach "Justice, Fairness,and
Morality", 4 CLIN. L. REV. 1 (1997) (criticizing failure of law schools to adequately teach
about justice and proposing a model for doing so); Pamela Edwards & Sheilah Vance,
Teaching Social Justice Through Legal Writing, 7 LEGAL WRITING 63, 64-70 (2001)
(describing many of the benefits of bringing social justice topics into a LRW course).
186 Luban & Millemann, supra note 172, at 80-81. He was speaking of the discovery that
the Supreme Court may revise facts to suit its needs in deciding cases. This new knowledge
upset the students' faith in the "authoritativeness of the Supreme Court," which had been
the "terra firma in their moral worlds." Id.
187 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & James J. Conley, The Alienation of Law Students, 75
MICH. L. REv. 887, 887 (1977) (reporting on survey results which indicated that approximately one in seven law students become "alienated"-that is, "drop[ ] out emotionally
and intellectually"); Jill Chaifetz, The Value of PublicService: A Model for Instilling a Pro
Bono Ethic in Law School, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1695, 1700 (1993) ("While student attitudes
change most significantly during the first year of law school, studies document a steady
disengagement from law school during students' entire three-year tenure. The further into
their first year students progress, the less positive their opinions about lawyer ethicality
and behavior remain.") (footnotes omitted); Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial
about the Dark Side of Law School, and Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively
Breaking the Silence, 52 J.LEGAL EDUC. 112, 117 (2002) (hypothesizing that there are four
paradigms of legal education which contribute to the gradual decrease of emotional and
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Capturing what a number of students said in different ways, one
LAWR II student said the course helped in "remembering why we all
came to law school. It's really hard to remember that; it seems very
jaded after one semester of just sitting in a classroom .... I know it

1 88
was a help to me to remember why I was here."'
The feelings of self-worth that helping others can produce also
can be a lifeline to students whose self-confidence is undermined by
the standard first-year curriculum. A LAWR II student described this,
stating: "[W]hen we first looked at the [case and the extensive legal
work that had been done], I just thought to myself, do they really have
enough faith in us [to] think we're going to find something that [the
lawyer] hasn't [found] in all of these papers." The student noted that
he sometimes felt, or was made to feel, "stupid" in other courses. "But
here it was more like you [the professors] had faith in us. [You conveyed that] you can do this; you can solve this problem." This investment of confidence, and the student's work during the semester, made
189
the student come to believe he could solve the problem.
Introducing actual legal work into LRW courses can change a second part of the law school culture: the nature of the relationship between teachers and students. When students and -faculty work
together on actual matters the relationship often changes from hierarchical to collegial. Such relationships can improve the quality of a student's education and reduce the stress of the first-year experience. 190
Although our LAWR III course was a second year course, the
model-27 students doing research and writing assignments generated
from an actual case-should work just as well in a first year LRW
course.

B.
1.

Challenges of Teaching LRW Courses with Actual Legal Work
Overloading Teachers and Students and Stretching Past Available
Resources

Overload is one of the risks of adding actual legal work and related teaching goals to LRW courses. 191 This causes educational
problems for the students and resource demands for the school. We
psychological well-being in most first-year students; discussing study which seems to confirm this hypothesis).
188 LAWR II student comments made as part of course evaluation.
189 LAWR II student comments made as part of course evaluation.
190 See generally Ann L. Iijima, The Collaborative Legal Studies Program:A Work in
Progress, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143 (2002) (suggesting that collaborative work by
students, with each other and faculty members, can reduce the stress of legal education as
well as improve the quality of education).
191 See, e.g., Silecchia, supra note 31, at 250-51 (warning about overloading LRW
courses with skills and other matters that can and should be taught in separate courses).
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deal with these issues together.
The resources that will be necessary to teach a LRW course with
actual legal work, and the ability to add features to that course, depend upon the course model.
Our LAWR II/LTP course, which included clinical and LRW
components and which we co-taught, demanded substantial student
time and teaching resources. 192 However, it was for five credits (a
sixth with the legal research component). 193 Despite the ambition of
our teaching goals, we do not believe the course was overloaded. Most
of the students thought it was hard, challenging, and full. To the extent
it was overloaded, and some students thought it was, we could have
unloaded it a bit by reducing the scope of the major writing assignment or eliminating it entirely. If we had chosen the latter option, we
could have focused more on the practice writing that the students did,
e.g., pleadings, motions, and pretrial memoranda.
Our supervisory responsibilities were substantially less than they
would have been in a clinic because the outside lawyers retained responsibility for the legal work, and the students did not make appear194
ances in court or otherwise represent the clients.
It might be possible for a single LRW professor to teach a course
like this. 95 We believe, however, that co-teaching such a course with a
clinical teacher is preferable. To do this, a school might offer a clinical
teacher a "rotation," i.e., a semester "off" from clinical teaching, to
develop and co-teach the course. This would enrich the LRW curriculum and should improve the quality of LRW instruction in the clinical
courses when the clinical teacher returns to clinical teaching.
As the course model moves down the continuum from hybrid
clinic to predominantly LRW, with fewer credits and larger numbers
of students, the potential for overload is greater. Many of our LAWR
III students complained that the course, which was for two credits,
was overloaded. 196 The source of the overload, at least measured by
192 This course falls within our C category in the introduction, supra. In this course, we
worked with the outside lawyers to select the legal work, and we created the course structure (co-counseling relationships, workgroups, and classes); taught LRW skills; prepared

the students for the other legal work they would do (including the client and witness interviews); supervised the students' work; conducted the classes and moderated the workgroup
meetings; developed course materials; taught with some of the body of experiencesincluding the clients legal work, structures of the cooperating public and private law firms
and systemic and professional responsibility issues; introduced students to the applicable
procedural and substantive law; and reviewed, critiqued, and graded the student work.

193 See supra Part II(B) for course description.

194 See supra Part II(B).
195 In fact, Schwinn has taught several LAWR/LTP courses by himself using the model
that we used in our LAWR II/LTP course.

196 See supra Part II(A) for course description. This course falls within our B category in

the introduction, supra.

Spring 20061

Teaching Legal Research

the features of a traditional LRW course, was not primarily the LRW

assignments based on the actual legal work. (There was some additional work required to supplement, organize, and use the facts of the
Anthony case). 197 Rather, it was the weekly workgroup meetings, ad
hoc student meetings, and the number of classes spent on topics other

than research and writing, for example, on access-to-justice issues.
However, these features were among the most important and successful in the course.
In teaching this course again, we would have four options: 1) add

a third credit to the course if we could; 2) trim coverage; 3) justify the
overload as a form of mandatory pro bono and teach with that issue
(thereby, we say only partially tongue-in-cheek, overloading the

course a little more); 198 or 4) not worry about it (accept the overload
in light of the educational value of the course). We favor the first

option.
Again, we think a LRW and clinical teacher should co-teach such
a course. However, that was less necessary in LAWR III than in
LAWR II/LTP. Substantial collaboration is needed, but the clinical
teacher could "refer" a legal matter to a LRW course, consult with the
LRW teacher, be available to field questions, and teach several clas-

ses, without co-teaching the entire course.
At the resource-light end of the continuum is a LRW course in
which the teacher bases a problem on an actual legal problem referred
by a clinical teacher or outside lawyer. 19 9 At the end of the semester,
the teacher would provide the referring lawyer with the students'

work product. Without committing substantially more resources to
such a course than to a traditional LRW course, it could satisfy the
197 See supra Parts II(A)(2)(b), III(A)(1)(b). It might have been possible to narrow the
scope of some of the assigned issues, but that would have further fragmented the case and
the students' responsibility for it. Indeed, one student criticized the extent to which we
already had "fragment[ed]" the Anthony case in order to generate seven sets of issues, one
for each of the seven workgroups.
198 Although we think there are strong arguments for a mandatory pro bono requirement, see, for example, David Luban, A Workable Plan for Mandatory Pro Bono, 5 REP.
INST. PHIL. & PUB. POL'Y 10 (1985); Millemann, supra note 126, this argument would be
exceedingly difficult to make if only the students in our LAWR III course were assigned
this obligation, particularly in light of our school's existing experiential course requirement, which our LAWR III course did not satisfy. See supra note 19.
199 This course falls within our A category in the introduction, supra. There are important differences between this problem and the types of canned problems that we criticize in
this article. This one presents the ultimate client-a real person or member of a real class
of people-to the students; it is based on real facts, hopefully presented in original forms,
e.g., transcripts, official reports, actual pleadings, and lower court decisions; it provides a
factual and personal, and therefore credible and interesting, basis to analyze professional
responsibility and access-to-justice issues; and it generates student work that others will be
used to represent the ultimate client.
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five criteria we identify in the introduction (be feasible, meet legal
need, achieve secondary educational goals, present visible clients, and
involve collaboration with clinical teachers and outside lawyers).
Under this model, the LRW teacher would develop competence in the
subject matter of the research (unless he or she already possessed it),
devise assignments based on the legal work, and bring into the course
and teach with the beneficiaries of the work (or a representative of
the class of beneficiaries).
There is another model that makes sense for advanced LRW
courses: teach them through clinics by incorporating the LRW component into a clinical course.200 Our school is now doing this with a yearlong clinical course that combines our LAWR III course (appellate
advocacy) and an appellate advocacy and post-conviction clinic. It is
an elective for second-year students that satisfies the LAWR III
20
requirement.
In sum, there are a number of models that a school can use to
combine LRW and clinical education in resource-sensitive ways.
2.

Professional Responsibility and Liability Issues

In using actual legal work to teach LRW courses, the teacher
must be clear about the relationships that this will create. Among the
issues are these: Will the work create an attorney-client relationship
with the beneficiary of the work? If not, what legal and ethical obligations will the teacher and students have to the beneficiary of the work
and to the person who refers the work? Will the teacher and students
be able to protect the confidences of the clients or prospective clients
of a referring attorney? What liability, if any, will the teacher and student have for the work they provide to another person, including a
referring lawyer?
We think there are good answers to these questions.
The models we propose do not create attorney-client relationships between the LRW teacher and the beneficiaries of the work. For
example, in our LAWR III course, our Clinical Law Office represented Anthony. 202 In our LAWR II course, outside lawyers represented the clients.20 3 Although our students interviewed the clients in
the police brutality cases, they did not give them advice or seek to
represent them.
In all three sets of cases, we did not make representations about
the legal work we were performing, and the lawyers understood that
200 This course falls within our D category in the introduction, supra.

201 See supra notes 9, 106. See generally Laflin, supra note 158.
202 See supra Part II(A).
203 See supra Part 11(B).
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they would have to make independent judgments about whether
and
204
how to use the students' work in representing their clients.
If a school decides, out of an abundance of caution, to bring the

LRW course activities within the scope of its clinic malpractice policy,
it probably can do so, at least under a model in which a clinical
teacher co-teaches the course or refers the legal work to the LRW
20 5
course.
Although the LRW teacher and students do not have an attor-

ney-client relationship with the beneficiary of their work under our
models, the confidentiality of communications is protected. The referring attorney has an attorney-client relationship with the client, and
that privilege protects the confidentiality of communications with
the
agents of the attorney who are helping the attorney to represent
20 7
client. 20 6 The LRW teacher and students are such agents.

Moreover, the work-product privilege is the attorney's, rather
than the client's, and is virtually absolute when the information sought
208
to be protected is not factual, but rather opinions and legal theories.
Again, this privilege protects the confidentiality of information developed in anticipation of litigation by agents-the LRW teacher and stu20 9
dents-of the referring attorney.
There is a practical, last-resort way to protect the confidentiality

of very sensitive client information in non-clinical courses taught with
actual legal work. Do not disclose it. This is a big step to take in a
course that depends in significant part on honesty and trust among
students and faculty, especially if the information is relevant to an issue on which a student is working. But, when warranted, and with
adequate notice to the students ("I may not be able to disclose every
204 We did not develop written agreements with appropriate disclaimers, but LRW
teachers who have liability concerns might wish to do so.
205 Our clinic's policy insures not only the clinic, but also any person who provides professional services on behalf of the clinic or under the direction of a clinical teacher. This
includes volunteers. Therefore, in our LAWR III course, Schwinn and the students were
covered because they were working at the direction of Millemann, a covered clinical
teacher. Moreover, our clinical policy expressly covers LTP faculty and students, and thus
covered us and the students in the LAWR II/LTP course. However, there may be a rider in
a clinic's policy that precludes coverage for cases in which an attorney is paid a fee. This
might remove coverage for cases referred from private law firms.
206 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. U.S. Mineral Prods. Co., 809 A.2d 1000 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2002); State ex rel. Med. Assurance W. Va., Inc. v. Recht, 583 S.E.2d 80 (W. Va. 2003);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954).
207 See, e.g., Dabney v. Inv. Corp. of Am., 82 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that
subordinates protected by attorney-client privilege include any law student acting as agent
of duly qualified attorney).
208 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Forma-Pack, Inc., 718 A.2d 1129 (Md. 1998).
209 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) (extending the work-product protection
to include the work product of agents for the attorney).
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fact in this case"), it is an option.
3.

Some Loss of Control

All of the good qualities of actual legal work-that it is clientcentered, dynamic, and sometimes indeterminate-make it more unpredictable than a canned problem. Most issues that have been
screened for merit prove to be meritorious as predicted; some do not.
The facts in a pre-established record do not change; those in a more
open-ended record do. Most clients and witnesses appear for scheduled client interviews; some do not.
With most actual legal work, the teacher cedes some control over
the process. With this come some unpredictable, or at least unpredicted, developments, and some unevenness in assignments. Some
students will report this in their evaluations as "disorganization." And
it is, compared to the orderly worlds they are used to: tried and true
canned problems; syllabi that provide fifteen- to twenty-page assignments per hour; and familiar modes of case analysis (facts, issue, rule,
principle, next case).
However, one of the purposes of teaching with actual legal work
to
help students learn to create structures where there are none, to
is
make mid-course corrections in response to new developments, and
creatively to construct legal arguments when there are no legal templates; that is, to bring order to disorderly events.
Having said this, students and faculty will feel uneasy at times, as
practicing lawyers do. There are good ways to prepare for this,
however.
At the threshold, organize the actual legal work as much as possible. It can take as much or more time to convert actual legal work into
good teaching material as it does to construct a good canned problem.
Eliminate predictable problems.
Accept that there will be unexpected developments. Warn the
students about this. Teach about the ways in which lawyers plan for
different contingencies. Do this before the need arises. Develop contingency plans, e.g., "reserve" assignments and "replacement legal
work."
Identify problems as soon as they develop (semesters go quickly)
and make the best mid-course corrections you and the affected students can. Factor unexpected developments into the grading criteria to
compensate for unevenness in assignments, and tell students you will
do this.2 10
210 Some LRW teachers who structure their courses in ways that are similar to ours
without using actual legal work face many of these same problems. For example, Kenneth
Chestek advocates teaching LRW courses "by tying all or most of the assignments into a
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And, keep your sense of humor.
4.

Student Discontent with Assigned Roles

Some of the students in the LAWR III course were unhappy in
being assigned to represent the State, if only hypothetically. They
pointed out that one goal of the course was to provide effective representation to Mr. Anthony, and they did not enjoy playing the "heavy."
This criticism produced some important discussions that we should
have had earlier, when we made the initial role assignments. We dis-

cussed the importance of identifying and making the opposing arguments as part of constructing and refining one's theory of the case,
and the ways in which the students who had been "state lawyers" had
been an essential part of helping Anthony. We should have anticipated this issue and assigned materials that would have presented the
21 1
competing "neutral" and "partisan" conceptions of a lawyer's role.
5.

Be Careful What You Wish for

One of the consequences of asking twenty-seven students in a
course (our LAWR III course) to work on a single matter is that it
produces twenty-seven papers to use on behalf of the client. As a
clinical teacher, it sometimes is difficult to integrate the written work
of two or three students into a single pleading. It is impossible to do so
with twenty-seven students. This means that the lawyer who represents the client, or the LRW teacher if that is the prior agreement, will
have to work to convert the collective student work product into a
coherent and unified document. The referring lawyer and LRW
teacher should resolve this issue in the referral agreement. It should
be possible to enlist the aid of a teaching assistant in doing this if the
teacher plans for it from the beginning.
single problem, which the students then work on all year as if they were lawyers." Chestek,
supra note 51, at 59. In his courses, he selects "a fact pattern taken from a real case" and
"reveal[s] the facts in stages, akin to the development of a real case." Id. at 65. "As the
semester progresses, more facts are revealed, but only as the students ask .... This allows
them to have a stake in the development of the record upon which their persuasive writing
will later be based." Id. This requires the student "to sift through all this undifferentiated
data to make decisions about which facts were legally relevant, which had persuasive value,
and which could simply be discarded." Id. Chestek's benefit-cost analysis is similar to ours.
Among the advantages: students can assume attorney roles, learn the importance of context, become responsible for the problem, learn to work together and "realistically" analyze ethical issues. Id. at 70-75. Among the disadvantages, there is less time for traditional
LRW skills, the professor loses some control over the teaching material, it is hard work for
teacher and students, the approach is "litigation centric," and students may have uneven
experiences. Id. at 76-81.
211 See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 36-38. See also Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 73-74 (1980).
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CONCLUSION

In this article, we encourage LRW teachers to use actual legal
work to generate research and writing assignments. We make a number of arguments in support of our proposal.
Actual legal work motivates students to learn the basic skills of
research, analysis and writing, and thus helps to accomplish the primary goals of LRW courses. It helps students to explore new dimensions of basic skills, including those related to the development and
use of facts and the construction of legal arguments in response to
indeterminate legal issues.
Through actual legal work, LRW teachers can achieve important
secondary educational goals, including introducing students to a client-centered, problem-solving form of representation, professional responsibility issues (especially access-to-justice and pro bono issues),
and critical analysis of law and justice systems.
Engaging first-year students in actual legal work can bring real
clients into the classroom, demonstrate to students that they can help
others (and that they like doing so), and thereby reinforce their idealism. We believe these are good refinements in the culture of traditional first-year legal education.
Our proposal, directly and indirectly, also would help individuals
and community organizations obtain legal assistance they need to prevent and resolve legal problems. We believe this is socially beneficial
and educationally valuable. There are several ways in which this may
occur. A LRW professor and students can provide representation that
otherwise would not be provided. Or, with the promise of help from a
LRW class, another lawyer-in a clinic or from outside the schoolmight agree to provide representation to a person who otherwise
would not be represented. Or, a LRW teacher and students might enhance the quality of representation in a case for which another lawyer
212
is primarily responsible.
In the longer term, we believe that engaging students in law
school in legal work on behalf of poor and underrepresented people
and groups will encourage a number of them to provide legal services
to similar clients in the future.
We have described two experimental courses that we developed
212 The student work can be valuable in different ways. When a case has complex factual
and legal issues, as did the Anthony case in the LAWR III course, see supra Part II(A), the
work of students, combined with the classroom and workgroup analysis of it, can substantially strengthen the theory-of-the case analysis. See supra Part II(A)(5). On the other
hand, in more straightforward cases, the students can perform supplemental tasks that busy
lawyers with lots of clients, e.g., legal services lawyers or assistant public defenders, may
not have time for.
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together and co-taught. Understanding the limitations of first-person
accounts, we have attempted to analyze the benefits of these courses
and courses like them and the challenges they pose to teachers, stu213
dents, and law schools. We believe the courses were successful.
There are many other possible ways to engage LRW students in actual
legal work. What is essential, in our view, is that LRW and clinical
teachers work together to create and test a variety of course models.
Although we point out the limits of one type of canned problem,
our argument assumes, and we believe, that many forms of teaching
problems are pedagogically valuable. Indeed, they comprise points on
a single continuum that includes actual legal work and reaches into
clinics. For example, well-constructed problems can introduce students to basic LRW skills, factual complexity, indeterminate legal issues, client-centered problem solving, and professional responsibility
issues. So can actual legal work, but in a different way; one that is
dynamic in a real, rather than artificial sense, and that gives students
some responsibility for another person, produces work that is useful to
that person, and thereby motivates-often, highly motivates-the student to learn. In the process, many students will begin to discover important things about themselves, e.g., that they enjoy helping others
and are, or are becoming, competent to do so, and some people who
need legal assistance will receive it.
In law schools, which value autonomy, it largely will be left to
individual faculty members whether and how to create and teach
courses like these. For us, it was very much worth the effort, and we
encourage others to try it.

213 Our student evaluations for the LAWR II and III courses were better than those we
have received for prior LRW courses taught without actual legal work, and were as strong
as the best evaluations we have received in non-LRW courses. In our experience, evaluations in LRW courses generally tend to be somewhat lower than in other courses. See supra
note 132. We enjoyed teaching these two courses as much as we have any courses in our
careers. See supra note 115.

